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Which the Deader Hand?
A Counter to the American Law Institute's
Proposed Revival of Dying Perpetuities Rules
Scott Andrew Shepard*
Encouragedpnmarily by a flake m federal estate and gMft t law, more than halfof the
stateshave either effectively or entiely abolishedther rules againstperpetwties in the past two
decades. The American Law Institute, deeply troubledby this development has adoptedfor its
Third Restatement a proposed rule against perpetuities that would essentially prohibit
conditionalgifts to continue for the benefit ofparties born more than two generationsaAer the
transferor
TheALIk efforts aremisguided The rule agaistperpetuitieswas theproduct ofa legal,
political,and social age very diffemnt than our own. It was designed in largepart to addess
concerns, such as inalienabilityconitions,that do not effectively exist in modern law either
because the evolution ofproperty structureshas dealt with theseproblems by other means, or
because changesin politicalandsocialstructurehave lessened the concerns. While some ofthe
old concerns do remain, in modfied form, the Rule Against 1erpeuitiesprovides a poor
response to them. It offers a medieval barberd amputation saw where the job demands a
modem surgeon&scapel. Though both may save thepatientfrom the ilness,the scalpel will do
a more exact andreablejob,with farless collateraldamage
This Article demonstrateswhere the ALI went wrong andfashions the scalpelequiredto
deal with moderniteralionsofdead-handcontrolissuesandrelatedproblems.
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INTRODUCTION

The Rule Against Perpetuities (RAP or Rule) has had a long run.
Its first forebear articulated in the Duke ofNorfolks Casein 1682,' the
Rule has been reduced to classic formula, has tormented generations
1.
Duke of Norfolk's Case, (1682) 22 Eng. Rep. 931; see also E.W Ives, The
Genesis of the Statute of Uses, 82 ENG. HIST. REv 673, 674 (1967) (chronicling early
restrictions on property transfers before the Duke ofNorfolkk Case).
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of law students and practitioners, and has evoked storms of scholarly
debate when torment led to rebellion against and eventual alteration of
that classic formula. No alteration, however, can save this ancient
cudgel of a Rule, nor render it fit for present purposes. Designed for
an era when most property was held in land, when landed property
carried with it profound political and social power, and when the trust
had not yet become a meaningful vehicle of conditional transfer, it has
outlived its usefulness. It is time for the Rule to go.
As it happens, the Rule has gone--entirely or effectively-in
more than half of the states in the country. These states have either
wholly abolished it, or have effectively abolished it by a variety of
means: by extending the perpetuities period to extraordinary lengths,
by rendering the RAP a default rule out of which transferors can opt,
or by excluding long-term or perpetual trusts from the application of
the Rule.
These developments have evoked consternation and response
from the American Law Institute (ALI). The ALI has rightly noted
that the states that have made these reforms have done so not on the
basis of principled, doctrinal objections to the RAP and its efficacy in
the modern world, but instead have acted in order to gain for their
citizens (either as settlors or as providers of trust services) the benefits
of a quirk in federal tax law. In the throes of preparing the
Restatement of the Law Third, Property: Wills and Other Donative
Transfers (Third Restatement), the ALI and the Restatement authors
registered their objection to the movement toward RAP abolition and
minted (in Division VIII (the Rule Against Perpetuities) of the Third
Restatement) a new RAP, one that they hope will stem the tide toward
abolition. Their new iteration of the Rule (proposed Rule or Third
Restatement RAP) would substitute for previous formulations a Rule
requiring, in brief, that conditional gifts end (generally, by the
dissolution of trusts) upon the deaths of the transferees who are two
generations younger than the transferor.
In this Article, I suggest that the ALI authors are misguided.
While the states may not have moved decisively toward RAP abolition
on principled grounds, there are in fact principled grounds upon which
to argue for RAP abolition. These grounds include the fact that the
RAP makes a poor vehicle for controlling dynastic wealth generation
and transmission; that the RAP cannot distinguish between good and
bad long-term conditional gifts; that many of the historical
justifications for the RAP no longer apply; and that the RAP inflicts
needless costs on society without any particular countervailing
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benefits. These grounds also include the fact that the legitimate deadhand concerns that do remain, given modem property structures, can
be addressed far more subtly, and at a far lower aggregate cost, by a
few relatively minor adjustments to existing property law-especially
to presumptions that apply to conditional gifts, whether legal (namely,
conditional estates) or equitable (namely, trusts). Further, I argue that
the specific RAP formulation proposed in the Third Restatement will
be no better on these grounds than some more recent RAP iterations,
and for that reason and others stands very little hope of adoption by the
states. Finally, I propose a concrete package of reforms to do the
useful work at which the RAP is aimed without also incurring the
unnecessary ancillary costs occasioned by the Third Restatement RAP,
or any other version.
This Article takes the following course. In Part II, I provide a
brief history of the development of the RAP, considering the evolution
of the "classic formulation" of life-in-being-plus-twenty-one-years and
the more recent wait-and-see versions of the Rule. In Part III, I review
the ALI authors' reasons for supporting a revival of the RAP generally
and their specific defenses of their particular Third Restatement RAP.
Part IV reviews other scholars' evaluations of the states' movement to
abolish the RAP and their proposed responses.
I critique the arguments of the ALI and of these other scholars in
Part V In Part VA, I consider whether any RAP is either necessary or
appropriate to the modem realities of society and of property law, and
conclude that it is not. First, the RAP, and state property law generally,
is the wrong place to address the question of whether to take state
action to diminish or destroy large family fortunes; that step should be
taken, or not, as a matter of federal tax law. Second, while one of the
central justifications of the RAP has long been its role in limiting
alienability restraints on property, that justification has largely
vanished. Third, dead-hand concerns have also been radically
diminished by modem property law developments. Those concerns
that remain are best addressed by changes to the rules under which
conditional-transfer documents are interpreted, and by legislative or
judicial action that bans and revises conditional gifts that contravene
some specific, clearly articulated, and generally agreed upon public
policy concern-not by a blanket ban on all conditional gifts that
continue beyond a specific, limited period. Finally, I demonstrate that
the ALI authors' narrow focus on so-called family-dynasty trusts, and
their specific concerns about such trusts, either undermine their
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position entirely or are easily dealt with by the expansion of rules
permitting trustees to avoid capricious trust management.
In Part VB, I consider particular drawbacks that append to the
Third Restatement RAP. These include the fact that, despite the ALI
authors' claims to the contrary, their proposed Rule would usually
result in a far shorter perpetuities period than applies under the most
common still-extant state RAPs, a problem that will likely get worse as
human longevity increases. As a result, the Third Restatement RAP is
not alive to changing social, legal, and technological conditions in the
ways claimed. These practical failings will provide additional
reinforcement to the structural factors that will discourage state
legislatures from following the ALI's recommendations.
I draw together in Part VI the concrete solutions I derive in Part V
to the dead-hand problems that still genuinely obtain. I initially
propose, of course, abolition of the RAP in the states that yet retain it,
while cautioning that for conditional gifts that carry inalienability
provisions, the alienability limitations should either be prohibited ab
initio or should be expressly limited to some fixed period. Next, I
propose a "rule of administrative efficiency" that would allow trustees
to effect revision of trust conditions, in accord with settlor intent and
with an eye toward long-term efficient management, when trustadministration expenditures exceed some fixed total of trust assets or
income. Additionally, in response to concerns that distribution
conditions will fail to anticipate unforeseeable changes in social
attitudes, family structures, or technological development, I propose
two possible changes to the presumptions applied when interpreting
conditional gifts, and consider the relative merits of each option.
Finally, I propose a "noxious-conditions" rule under which conditional
gifts that are legal when made but that become noxious to changing
public sentiment and public policy over time are-at the time that the
conditions and the behaviors for which they create incentives become
noxious-explicitly struck on the grounds of noxiousness. This rule
will permit conditional grants to remain in force if they do not, over
long periods, manifestly offend overwhelming contemporary
sensibilities. These carefully crafted reforms should do all of the
necessary work that the Third Restatement RAP-or any RAPwould do, without the unnecessary bluntness, and unnecessary costs,
that must arise from a RAP
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A BRIEF
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HISTORY OF THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES

Various scholars, including perhaps most famously Professor
John Chipman Gray,2 have charted the history and development of the
RAP in fascinating detail.' This Part includes only a brief sketch of
that history and development, the necessary background for the
discussion that follows.
The RAP arose as an intervention in favor of alienability of
property interests in a long war between testators and devisees over the
question of whose plans for a given res of property should trump. In
the initial position-in England before and during the thirteenth
century-neither testators nor devisees enjoyed free alienability or
plenary control of their lands.' Instead, ultimate control of land
transfers lay in the hands of feudal lords and ultimately the king.' This
feudal control was lifted in 1290 with the Statute Qia Emptores,' but
a nearly contemporary act of Parliament, the Statute de Donis
Conditionaibus of 1285, substituted for the lord's veto an estate
known as the "fee tail."' The fee tail estate allowed freeholders to
"entail" their land, so that each succeeding generation would hold the
land and enjoy its use, but would lack the power to alienate the land
from the original entailer's line of lineal descendants. (In effect,
entailment of property created "a perpetual series of life estates.")
One primary effect of entailing land was that no present
possessors of the land could alienate the property in fee simple; at
most, they could grant an interest in the land for the period of their
lives. Had the courts strictly honored the entail and had the general
run of landowners taken up the opportunity of entailing their estates,
the result would have been the practical inalienability of most of

2.

See JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES

§§

125-141.5, at 127-

41 (Roland Gray ed., Little, Brown & Co. 4th ed. 1942) (1886).
3.
See, eg., A.W BRIAN SIMPSON, LEADING CASES IN THE COMMON LAW 76-79
(1995) [hereinafter SIMPSON, LEADING CASES]; A.WB. SIMPSON, LEGAL THEORY AND LEGAL
HISTORY: ESSAYS ON THE COMMON LAW 143-62 (1987) [hereinafter SIMPSON, LEGAL

THEORY]; George L. Haskins, Extending the Grasp of the Dead Hand: Reflectons on the
Oigins of the Rule Aganst Perpetwdes, 126 U. PA. L. RE. 19 (1977); W Barton Leach,
Perpetuitiesi Perspective: Ending the Rules Reign of Termr, 65 HARv. L. REv. 721, 722-27
(1952).
4.
See, eg., Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, The Rise ofthe PerpetualTUs4 50
UCLA L. REv. 1303, 1319 (2003).
5.
See id.
6.
Statute Quia Emptores, 1290,18 Edw. 1,cc. 1-3 (Eng.).
7.
Statute de Donis Conditionalibus, 1285, 13 Edw. 1, cc. 1-50 (Eng.).
8.
Dukeminier & Krier,supra note 4, at 1320.
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England's wealth.' Given that the stock of land is essentially fixed and
that the fixed stock of land is particularly limited in a country that
shared a small island with at least one other country,o the result would
have severely curtailed both English liberty and opportunities for
English economic development."
To avoid these increasingly problematic ends, the courts stepped
in near the end of the fifteenth century to curtail the fee tail by a
process called "barring the entail." 2 This process allowed present
possessors of the fee tail to convert it into a fee simple absolute (and
thus to alienate the interest) simply by bringing suit for a "common
This effective gutting of the fee tail gave present
recovery."
possessors of property a relatively direct route to alienability.
Posterity- and patrimony-minded devisors, however, fought back.
Employing life estates and contingent remainders, and, later (following
their creation in the Statute of Uses, which took effect in 153614),
executory interests, testators managed effectively to revive the
opportunity for perpetual devises and for permanently rendering land
inalienable." The judicial response this time was the-or at least arule against perpetuities. Announced in the Duke ofNorfolk Case,
the Rule did not originally take the strict and convoluted life-in-being9.
Land represented, far and away, the single greatest store of wealth (and basis of
power) in England during this period. See, e.g., id. ("In the early years of the Rule against
Perpetuities, future interests were usually in land, then the chief form of wealth in England
. . . ."); Haskins, supm note 3, at 27-28 ("Land was the basis of economic subsistence, wealth,
family solidarity, social status and above all security. ... Apparently, so much of the land in
England had been tied up in entails of this sort that it became unsafe to take a conveyance lest
one lose it [as the result of an ancient and undiscovered entail].").
10. Scotland was unquestionably a separate country from England until the Acts of
Union of 1707, Acts of Union, art. I (1707), though the monarchies of the two countries were
united when King James VI of Scotland also became King James I of England upon
Elizabeth's death in 1603. Wales remained a fully separate country until 1282-83, when it
was conquered by England and became a principality of the English King. See, e.g., R.R.
Davies, Colonial Wales, 65 PAST & PRESENT 3, 3 (1974); Rees Davies, Wales: A Culture
Preserved BRITISH BROADCAST CORP., http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/middle-ages/
culture-preserved_01.shtml#three (last updated Feb. 17, 2011). England and Wales were
melded into a single state and jurisdiction by the Laws in Wales Acts of 1536. Davies, Wales:
A Cultum Preserved supm; see also I FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WrLLIAM
MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 90 (2d ed. 1959).
11.
See, e.g., SIMPSON, LEGAL THEORY, supra note 3, at 151, 159-60; see infm notes
146-148 and accompanying text.
12.
SeeTaltarum's Case, YB. 12 Edw. 4, fol. 19, pl. 25 (1472) (Eng.).
13. See, eg., Dukeminier & Krier,supm note 4, at 1320; Haskins, supm note 3, at 2829 ("Through the device of the common recovery the fee tail became freely alienable by the
person in possession and that person could effectively convey an estate in fee simple
absolute.").
14.
See Statute of Uses, 1535, 27 Hen. 8, c. 10 (Eng.); Ives, supranote 1, at 674-75.
15.
Dukeminier & Krier,supranote 4, at 1320.
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plus-twenty-one-years form that has haunted more recent generations
of law students. 6 Rather, under the Rule announced in the Duke of
Norfolk' Case, the courts first "permitted transferors to control
inheritance of the family estate for a period equal to the lives of
persons they knew and whose competence they could judge, plus any
actual minorities thereafter,"" though by the end of the eighteenth
century, courts had begun to cite the case as the font of the Rule as we
know it today." Professor Gray crystallized the Rule for American
audiences in the second edition of his classic treatise on the RAP: "No
interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one
years after some life in being at the creation of the interest.""
So matters rested with a compromise between grantors' and
takers' interests until the middle of the twentieth century whenechoing and responding to the agony of confusion that the RAP of
Gray's definition created for practitioners and grantors-reform began
in the states and defenders of reform stepped forward in the academy.20
First, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania revised its RAP in 1947 to
require courts to allow conditional grants to unwind, and to wait and
see whether they actuallyviolated the RA, rather than determining at
the outset whether they conceivably couldviolate the Rule.2' Within a
few years, Professor Barton Leach advocated reform of the Rule along
the wait-and-see lines that Pennsylvania had embraced.22 Leach's
advocacy inaugurated a series of "Perpetuities Wars,"23 as eminent
scholars in the field debated various subtleties of the proposed

16.

Duke of Norfolk's Case, (1682) 22 Eng. Rep. 931; see also Ives, supra note 1, at

674.
17. Dukeminier & Krier, supm note 4, at 1320; see also W Barton Leach & Owen
Tudor, The Common Law Rule Against Perpetides, i 6 AMERICAN LAW PROPERTY § 24.16,
at 51 (1952) ("In a will a man of property could provide for all of those in his family whom
he personally knew and the first generation after them upon attaining majority.").
18. See, e.g., Long v. Blackall, 101 Eng. Rep. 875, 876-77 (1797) ("The usual period
allowed by law after which an executory devise may take effect, is a life or lives in being and
twenty-one years afterwards, as settled in the case of The Duke ofNorfolk. . . .").
19. GRAY, supra note 2, § 201, at 191; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP: DONATIVE
TRANSFERS 115 n.13 (Tentative Draft No. 6, 2010) [hereinafter Tentative Draft].
20. See, e.g., Leach, supm note 3, at 722 (noting that the Rule "has been made badly,
or so intricately that it is a dangerous instrumentality in the hands of most members of our
profession," so that "our corporate responsibility to the public is not being met"); Tentative
Draft, supra note 19, at 115 ("[T]he mechanism embodied in the common-law Rule was illchosen[,] difficult to master[, and] mysterious and confusing.").

See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6104(b) (West 2011).
21.
See Leach, supranote 3.
22.
23. Susan F. French, Perpetuities: Three EssaysM Honor ofMy Father,65 WASH. L.
RE. 323, 332-33 & n.24 (1990).
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reforms.24 The wait-and-see supporters prevailed. The ALI adopted
the wait-and-see doctrine in the Second Restatement in 1979.25 The
Uniform Law Commission promulgated a wait-and-see Rule in its
1986 Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities (USRAP) that
adopted a ninety-year wait-and-see period, thus largely retiring the
vagaries of lives-in-being-plus-twenty-one-years." More than half of
the states adopted the USRAP.27 None retain the Rule in its traditional
form.28
Even as the USRAP swept the traditional Rule before it, however,
a new wave of reform began to crash onto shore. Tax law changes in
1986 both tightened the generation-skipping transfer tax (GST tax)29
and included an exemption in that tax that allowed at least $1 million
per grantor " to pass unburdened by the GST tax directly to
24. See, e.g., 10 RIcHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 75A.07
(Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2000) (listing articles contributing to the wait-and-see debates);
Dukeminier & Krier, supm note 4, at 1306-11 (recounting these wars further and adding
another objection to the form of wait and see that the Uniform Statutory Rule Against
Perpetuities (USRAP) endorsed, namely that "ninety [years] is on its face a number and not a
principle"); Joshua C. Tate, Perpetual Trustsand the Settlork Intent, 53 U. KANS. L. REv. 595,
600-01 (2005) (detailing some of the disputes).
25.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS §§ 1.1-.6 (1983).
26. See Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Uniform StatutoryRule Against Perpetuities:
The Rationale of the 90-Year Waiting Pedod, 73 CORNELL L. RE. 157, 158-60 (1988).
Actually, the USRAP retained what might be called a vestigial life-in-being-plus-twenty-oneyears formulation. Validity under the rule could be guaranteed by establishing that the
interest was certain to vest within twenty-one years after the death of some life in being.
Failing that, the ninety-year wait-and-see period began. See UNIF. STATUTORY RULE AGAINST
PERPETUITIES § l (1990).
27.
See, eg., Tentative Draft, supra note 19, at 118 & n. 19 (listing states that have
adopted and still retain the USRAP); Tate, supra note 24, at 601 n.31 (listing the thirty-one
states that, along with the District of Columbia, had adopted the USRAP and had not yet
repealed it as of 2005).
28.
See Tentative Draft, supra note 19, at 118 (noting that all states except Alabama
and Arkansas have abandoned the traditional formulation); 2011 Ala. Acts 532 (H.B. 28)
(enacting Alabama's adoption of the USRAP); Lynn Foster, Filly-One Flowers: PostPerpetuities War Law and Arkansast Adoption of USRAP, 29 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK L. REv.
411 (2007) (noting Arkansas' adoption of the USRAP).
29. See I.R.C. §§ 2600-2663 (2006). Since 1916, except in 2010, the United States
has taxed property transfers by will, intestacy, or survivorship, with similar levies placed on
inter vivos gifts. See also 5 BORIs 1.BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF
INCOME, EsrATES AND Givrs 1 120.1, at 120-1 to -2 (2d ed. 1993). Until 1986, however,
grantors could grant a life estate to a child, with the remainder in a grandchild, and incur only
one round of taxation, thus "skipping" a "generation" of tax. Id. j 120.2.3, at 120-11 to -12.
The tax reforms of 1986 included a "generation-skipping transfer tax" that closed this taxavoidance opportunity by levying estate or gift tax upon the death of the life-estate grantee.
See I.R.C. § 2612.
30. The amount of the exemption began at $1 million, was raised in 2002 to $1.1
million as an inflation adjustment, rose throughout the last decade, became total (wholly
eliminated the estate and gift tax) in 2010, and was set to return to $1.1 million plus some
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grandchildren, or via trust that resulted in one or more generationskipping transfers." The duration of such trusts-and the attendant tax
benefits-were limited only by state RAPs.32 In response to this
incentive, an increasing flood of states has either extended the waitand-see period of their modified RAPs to extraordinary lengths,"
allowed grantors to opt out of the state's Rule, 34 or effectively
eliminated the RAP altogether, at least with regard to trusts."
At present, then, more than half of the states have effectively
eliminated the application of the RAP (at least as to trusts) as a
mandatory rule."
III. THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S PROPOSAL FOR REVIVING
AND REVISING THE RULE

The ALI began the process of drafting and approving the Third
Restatement in 1991." Volume three of that Restatement includes
Division VIII, which focuses specifically on the RAP." This newly
revised Division VIII is the ALI's first promulgation of a revised RAP
since 1979, when it proposed the wait-and-see revisions to the Rule."
It thus represents the ALI's first Restatement response to the post-1986
trend toward practically or completely eliminating the RAP.40
The ALI, in short, wholly disapproves of "the recent trend to
abolish limits on perpetual trusts."4 1 Rather, per its Director, it
considers the Rule to be a "need[ed] time limit[] on these trusts to ease
commerce and to permit the living to govern assets."42 As a result, it
inflation adjustment in 2011. See I.R.C. §2631(c); Tentative Draft, supm note 19, at 123-24;
see also Darien B. Jacobson, Brian G. Raub & Barry W Johnson, The Estate Tax: Ninety
Years and Counting,STAT. OF INCOME BULL., Summer 2007, at 118, 124.
See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 4, at 1313 (citing I.R.C. § 2631(a), (c)
31.
(1994)).
32. Id at 1313-14.
33. Tentative Draft, supma note 19, at 125 (listing nine states that have adopted
perpetuities periods of between 360 and 1000 years).
34. Id (listing seven states and the District of Columbia that allow grantors to opt out
of the RAP).
35. Id. at 124 (listing seventeen states and the District of Columbia that have
eliminated the RAP as applied to trusts).
36. See id. at 124-25. The figures above cannot simply be added, because some
states (and the District of Columbia) appear on more than one list. Id
37. Id at ix.
38. Seeid.atix-xi.
39. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 1.1-.6 (1983).
40.
See supra note 33 and accompanying text (rendering the RAP functionally
irrelevant by setting centuries-long perpetuities periods or eliminating the rule altogether).
41. Lance Liebman, Forewordto Tentative Draft, supa note 19, at xi.
42. Id
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has approved a proposal that the RAP "be simplified by replacing
'lives in being' with 'generations': thus trust limitations established by
a settlor would only be enforceable for the next two generations.""
Subpart A below explains the Rule that the ALI has proposed,
and reviews the ALI's defenses of this proposed Rule, as opposed to
the traditional Rule or the wait-and-see Rule (still based on the
traditional Rule) that it endorsed in the Second Restatement. Subpart
B reviews what the Director of the ALI considers "convincing"
arguments against the movement to eliminate the RAP altogether.45
Critique of the proposed Rule and the ALI's arguments in its favor of
reinstituting a RAP awaits in Part IV
A.

The ProposedRuleand theALMhAsseldions oflts Superioity
overPreviousRules
The ALI has approved the following Rule:
(a) A trust or other donative disposition of property is subject to
judicial modification . . . to the extent that the trust or other
disposition does not terminate on or before the expiration of the
perpetuity period, except that if, upon the expiration of the
perpetuity period, the share of a beneficiary is distributable upon
reaching a specified age and the beneficiary is then younger than
the earlier of the specified age or the age of 30, the beneficiary's
share may, without judicial modification, be retained in trust until
the beneficiary reaches or dies before reaching the earlier of the
specified age or the age of 30.
(b) The perpetuity period expires at the death of the last living
measuring life. The measuring lives are as follows:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2), the measuring
lives constitute a group composed of the following
individuals: the transferor, the beneficiaries of the disposition
who are related to the transferor and no more than two
generations younger than the transferor, and the beneficiaries

43.
See, e.g., Charles E. Griffin, ALI Adopts Position in Opposition to Recent
StatutoryMovement Allowing Perpetual orMultiple-CenturiesTrusts,ALI ANNUAL MEETING
BLOG (May 18, 2010, 11:01 AM), http://2010am.ali.org/blog.cfn?startrow=21 (confirming
adoption); Lawrence W. Waggoner, CurtailingDead-Hand Control: The American Law
Institute Declares the Perpetual-TrustMovement Ill Advised 1 n. 1 (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch.
Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 199, 2010) [hereinafter
CurtailingDead-HandControl| (reporting that the floor vote was unanimous).
44. Liebman, supra note 41, at xi; see also Lawrence W Waggoner, The Ameiican
Law Institute Proposes a New Approach to Perpetuties: Lhnitng the DeadHand to Two
Younger GenerationsI (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper
Series, Working Paper No. 200,2010).
45. Liebman, supranote 41, at xi.
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of the disposition who are unrelated to the transferor and no
more than the equivalent of two generations younger than the
transferor.
(2) In the case of a trust or other property arrangement for the
sole current benefit of a named individual who is more than
two generations younger than the transferor or more than the
equivalent of two generations younger than the transferor, the
measuring life is the named individual.46
In essence, the Rule retains the wait-and-see innovations of the
Second Restatement, but abandons the traditional life-in-being-plustwenty-one-years formulation of the Rule.47 Instead, it substitutes a
two-generations Rule.48 Under this Rule, transferors may make
conditional gifts (including by establishment of trusts) that remain
conditional until the death of transferees (whether or not born at the
time the grant is made) who are up to two generations younger than
the transferors.49 If the transferees are not blood relatives of the
transferor, the Rule assumes that the transferor lives at the center of
"his" generation and posits generation equivalents of twenty-five
years."o Thus, a transferee born ten years after the transferor is deemed
to share a generation with the transferor, while one born three years
later is deemed to be a member of the next generation."
Two exceptions to this basic rule arise. The first occurs if a
conditional grant is made "for the sole current benefit of a beneficiary
such as a living great-grandchild" who would, by definition, fall more
than two generations beyond the transferor's generation.52 Conditional
gifts made to such specific, in-being individuals remain valid until the

46. Tentative Draft, supra note 19, at 135-36 (specifying text of proposed section
27.1, Statement of the Rule Against Perpetuities, of the Proposed Third Restatement: Wills).
47. Id § 27.1 cmts. a-b, at 136-37 ("Subsection (b) switches perpetuity law from the
traditional lives-n-being-plus-21-yearsperpetuity period to a generations-based period."). Of
course, the USRAP had already effectively abandoned the twenty-one-years formulation in
favor of a ninety-year wait-and-see rule. See supranote 26 and accompanying text.
48. Tentative Draft, supranote 19, at 137.
49. Id. ("[T]his Restatement measures the perpetuity period by generations, without
regard to whether each or any member of the measuring generation was 'in being' when the
interest was created.").
50. Id. §27.1 cmt. f, at 144 ("(1) [A]n individual born not more than 12 Y2years after
the date of the birth of the transferor [is] assigned to the transferor's generation, (2) an
individual born more than 12 Y2years but not more than 37 V2years after the date of the birth
of the transferor [is] assigned to the first generation younger than the transferor, and
(3) similar rules [apply] for a new generation every 25 years.").
5 1. Id
52. Id. § 27.1 cmt. h, at 144.
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death of the individual transferee." Second, if, when the perpetuities
period expires, a transferee who was to take a distribution from a trust
is younger than the age at which that beneficiary was to receive the
distribution, the distribution will be delayed until that beneficiary
either reaches the specified age or turns thirty, whichever is earlier.54
Once all of these relevant grantees have died, the perpetuities
period has run. If the conditions of the grant have not naturally
resolved, or the trust terminated, by this time, then the grant or trust is
subject to judicial modification." The ALI instructs judges to modify
"in a manner that most closely approximates the transferor's
manifested plan of distribution," while conforming to the Rule's dictate
that the conditions of the gift be terminated and the res distributed."
The ALI had a relatively easy case to make in advocating its
Third Restatement Rule over its Second Restatement version, because
the earlier Restatement proposal, unlike the USRAP, still relied
exclusively on the traditional RAP mechanism for setting the
perpetuity period." As noted above, the ALI recognized that the
traditional Rule wrapped generations of students and practitioners in a
fog of confusion and frustration." It further asserted that the common
law version of the traditional Rule (that is, before the wait-and-see
revolution) performed poorly the task of limiting dead-hand control
because of its overinclusiveness." Because of fictions such as the
"fertile octogenarian" and the "unborn widow,"' which presume that
Id.("Requiring the beneficiary to be a named individual is intended to assure that
53.
the beneficiary is in being when the trust or other property arrangement is established.... If,
during the beneficiary's life, the beneficiary ceases being the sole current beneficiary, the
beneficiary can no longer be a measuring life and, unless there are subsection (b)(1)
measuring lives who are still living, the perpetuity period then expires.").
54. Id. § 27.1 cmt. a, at 136-37.
55. Id. § 27.1 cmt. a, at 135.
56. Id. § 27.2, at 153.
57. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text (comparing the details of the
Second Restatement rule and the USRAP).
58. See supm note 20 and accompanying text (discussing complexities of traditional
RAP); see alsoTentative Draft, supra note 19, at 115.
59. See Tentative Draft, supra note 19, at 116 ("[T]he common-law Rule serves the
limited-dead-hand-control policy poorly, because it defeats dispositions that do not violate
that policy.").
60. See id. at 115. The authors presume "that every individual, man or woman, is
irrebuttably presumed to be physically capable of having a child until death," even women
who have passed through menopause. Id. Curiously, with the advent of regularized adoption
procedures and modern, technology-assisted reproductive procedures, such a presumption is
nothing like as far-fetched as it used to be, whatever the (dubious) underlying merits of the
"must-vest" nature of the common law rule.
See id. at 116 (presuming that a living grantee, regardless of age, could marry a
61.
widow not yet born at the time of the grant).
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technically conceivable but highly implausible events might transpire,
and because the common law Rule was a vesting rule, it often struck
down conditional gifts that stood no real, plausible chance of allowing
for dead-hand control beyond the perpetuities period.62
The ALI also specifically promoted the Third Restatement Rule
over the wait-and-see Rule of the Second Restatement." It suggested
that the two-generations Rule proves superior to the previous Rule,
based in the original perpetuity calculation, because the new
formulation is "more consistent with the know-and-see theory,"' the
theory that "'donors should be allowed to exert control through the
youngest generation of descendants they knew and saw, or at least one
or more but not necessarily all of whom they knew and saw."'"
Similarly, "[r]equiring the lives to be in being at the creation of the
interest prevents the perpetuity period from adjusting to
[individualized] trust and family circumstances, because that
requirement often divides members of the same generation into
measuring and non-measuring lives.""
The ALI also asserted that its two-generations Rule proves
superior to the traditional Rule because the traditional focus on
contingencies and vesting, while having "some merit," was "not well
aligned" with what the authors asserted (thereby setting themselves in
contrast both to previous iterations of the Restatement and to most
scholarly considerations of the subject) to be the sole "purpose of the
[RAP], which is to limit dead-hand control."" This change also
permitted the authors to dispense with the distinction between
contingent and vested interests, by applying the new Rule to both
kinds." In other words, the new Rule actually expands the reach of
perpetuities limitations to a category heretofore untouched by the
RZAp 70
62. The common law rule only allowed an interest to stand if it was clear at the time
of the grant that it would vest or fail within the perpetuities period.
63.
SeeTentative Draft, supra note 19, at 130-32.
64. Id.at 130.
65.
Id at 114-15 (quoting Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Uniform Statutory Rule
Against Perpetuities,21 REAL. PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 569, 587 (1987)). For a critique of this
assertion, see mfr Part VA.3.
66. Tentative Draft, supra note 19, at 130.
67. See ifra Part VA.2 (reviewing the scholarly consensus that limiting dead-hand
control was merely one of the purposes of the RAP).
68. Tentative Draft, supra note 19, at 131.
69. See id. at 131-32; see also Waggoner, supra note 44, at 4-5.
70. See Tentative Draft, supra note 19, § 27.1 cmt. a, at 136 ("The Rule is no longer a
rule against remoteness of vesting that only applies to a contingent future interest: The
distinction between a contingent and a vested future interest is irrelevant.").
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The authors further asserted that the Rule had not been designed
either to lengthen or shrink the mean duration of the perpetuities
period and concluded that "[a]lthough the length of the two periods
will be different in individual cases, the average length will probably
work out to be . .. the same.""

The ALI did not directly compare its new Rule to the USRAP's
ninety-year wait-and-see formulation, despite recognizing that it, and
not the Second Restatement's Rule, is the one currently followed by
those states that have not moved toward RAP repeal." Because the
USRAP effectively abandons the twenty-one-years formulation,
arguments based in the two-generations Rule's superiority over the
traditional formulation have little purchase against the USRAP
Perhaps the authors might have adopted Professors Dukeminier and
Krier's argument against the ninety-year limit: because it removed the
direct connection between the principles animating the Rule and the
length of the perpetuities period, the ninety-year wait-and-see Rule led
inexorably (and, to the authors' mind, perniciously73 ) to the current
widespread abolition of the RAP 4 Surely, the Third Restatement
authors would assert that the ninety-years Rule resembles the
traditional formulation in being less supple than the two-generations
Rule in its responsiveness to the actual contours of families to whom
the Rule will be applied-at least with regard to intrafamily continuing
conditional gifts.
B.

The ALIIN JustifationsforRevivig the RAP atAll

Of course, the ALI does not have the luxury of a world in which
all (or even most) states have adopted and retained its Second
Restatement Rule-or even the USRAP-and now must merely be
convinced to transfer to its Third Restatement Rule. Rather, the
majority of states have by now effectively or completely abolished
71. Id at 130. Supporting arguments and explanations appear on pages 130-31 of the
Tentative Draft. For a critique of this claim, see ifa Part VB.2.
72. Tentative Draft, supra note 19, at 118 n.19 (listing fifteen states that still follow
the USRAP to some degree).
See id. at 119-29; hfinr Part II.B (reviewing ALI's objections to RAP repeal);
73.
rn/i Part IV (critiquing these objections).
74. See Dukeminier & Krier,supra note 4, at 1309-11. The Al authors very likely
would not adopt this argument if given the opportunity, at least not explicitly, as the ALI's
Reporter for the Third Restatement of Property is Professor Waggoner, a chief author and
defender of the USRAP and of the ninety-year period. See, e.g., Waggoner, supm note 26;
Lawrence W Waggoner, Perpetuities: A ProgassReport on the Draft Unifonn Statutory
Rule Against Perpetuities, in THE TWENTIETH ANNUAL PHILIP E. HECKERLING INSTITUTE ON
ESTATE PLANNING 700 (John T. Gaubatz ed., 1986).
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their RAPs." To effect adoption of their new Rule, then, the ALI must
convince states not only to swap RAPs, but to reintroduce a RAP after
they have effectively or actually repealed theirs.
The authors made the point, recounted above," that the creation
of the GST tax (along with its exemptions) in 1986 provided the
impetus for the broad movement toward abolition of the RAP, and
asserted that, as a result, "[t]he policy issues associated with"
removing the RAP's curb on "dead-hand" control and "allowing
perpetual or multiple-centuries trusts have not been seriously discussed
in the legislatures."" Their own consideration of such policy issues led
them to conclude that the consequences of the move were dire.
The move toward RAP abolition struck the authors as a betrayal
by the states of their obligation to undergird what the authors asserted
to be immutable federal tax policy. " They worried that trust
management carefully geared to avoid the GST tax by taking
advantage of the federally created exemptions "[p]otentially ... could,
over time, lead to large concentrations of wealth within a relatively
small number of family dynasties and financial institutions."o They
deemed such developments "contrary to longstanding federal tax
policy,"" even though they recognized that "[d]espite the growing
state-level movement to permit GST-exempt perpetual or multiplecenturies trusts, Congress has not acted to curb the duration of GSTexempt trusts," an act wholly within its power, and that in fact
Congress "has increased the amount that can initially be exempted"

75.
See supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text (noting a state tide toward
repealing RAP).
76. See supra PartI.
77. Tentative Draft, supra note 19, at 123 ("The GST tax sparked a movement for
states to abolish the Rule Against Perpetuities in order to allow transferors to create perpetual
... trusts that persist through more than one generation.").
78.
Id at 126; see also Waggoner, supm note 43, at 1-2. In fact, the legislatures were
spurred to action by at least one more consideration: "[1]awyer self-interest." Stewart E.
Sterk, JurisdictionalCompetition To Abolish the Rule Agahnst Perpetuities: R.LP for the
R.A.P, 24 CARDozo L. REv. 2097, 2101 (2003). Professor Sterk explained that "[a]s state
after state abolished or liberalized" the rules limiting who could sue attorneys for failures
properly to apply the Rule, "the Rule's complexity-and the potential for error-loomed as a
potential source of lawyer liability." Id.
79. For a critique of these arguments, see infa Part VA. 1.
80. Tentative Draft, supm note 19, at 124; see also Ray D. Madoff, Op-Ed., America
Builds an Aristocracy,N.Y TIMES, July 12, 2010, at A19. This is in part because "[u]nder
current tax law, once a trust qualifies for the GST[-tax] exemption, the exemption continues
as long as the property remains in the trust." Tentative Draft, supm note 19, at 124.
81.
Tentative Draft, supra note 19, at 124 (citing COMM. ON FIN., U.S. SENATE,
EcoNOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981, S. REP. NO. 97-144, at 124 (1981)).
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from the GST tax in the manner detailed above." Nevertheless, they
asserted that states' willingness to alter their law to take advantage of
this federal disposition regrettably and inappropriately "exhibited
greater interest in generating trust business for in-state institutional
trustees" and, presumably, creating tax savings for trust settlors "than
in protecting the federal fisc.""
The authors also argued that abolition of the RAP would vitiate
still-vital restrictions on dead-hand control of property in what the
authors considered deeply deleterious ways. They suggested that
abolition would, for instance, allow trusts to arise that would require
payment to massively unwieldy numbers of beneficiaries, permit
trustees to establish trusts on behalf of descendants only
infinitesimally related to the transferor, and allow transferors to make
dispositions that must grow irreparably incoherent in the fullness of
time.
To support these claims, the authors first asserted that the only
purpose of the RAP that needed to be considered was that of limiting
dead-hand control of wealth, in the narrow sense of restricting
conditions placed on how otherwise freely alienable and transmutable
property could be spent by transferees.84 They waved aside the longstanding consensus" that one of the original justifications for the RAP
was that it provided a means of promoting free alienability of land and
asserted that because free alienability can be achieved today even for
conditional gifts of perpetual duration, the fact that free alienability
might long have provided a central rationale for the RAP is irrelevant."
Next, the authors followed Professors Hobhouse and Leach in
concluding that the 'fair balance between the desires of members of
the present generation, and similar desires of succeeding generations,
to do what they wish with the property which they enjoy""' is achieved
by embracing the see-and-know standard, allowing donors "'to exert
82. Id; see supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text (describing increases in GST
tax exemption through 2010).
83.
Tentative Draft, supranote 19, at 124.
84. See id at 113-14.
85.
See mra Part VA.2 (detailing long-standing consensus).
86. Tentative Draft, supra note 19, at 113-29 ("Ifthe Rule had any effect in promoting
the alienability of land, that effect has receded in importance with the rise of the management
trust in which the trustee normally has the power to buy and sell trust assets."); see id (failing
to recognize that the ability to achieve free-alienability without a perpetuities limitation
undermines the modem rationale for a RAP). For a critique of this position, see infra Part
VA.2.
87. Tentative Draft, supm note 19, at 114 (quoting Lewis M. Simes, The Policy
Against Perpetuities,103 U. PA. L. REv 707, 723 (1955)).
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control through the youngest generation of descendants they knew and
saw, or at least one or more but not necessarily all of whom they knew
and saw."' 8 A key premise of the know-and-see standard, they
claimed, is that "'it was the function of the courts to favour prudent
and sensible dispositions, and, as a corollary, invalidate foolish ones.' 89
The authors then noted that perpetual trusts, if designed to
support all of a transferor's lineal descendants, would rapidly grow to
unmanageable size. "On average, a transferor will have about 450
descendants (who are beneficiaries of the trust) 150 years after the
trust is created, over 7,000 beneficiaries 250 years after the trust is
created, and about 114,500 beneficiaries 350 years after the trust is
created."" Such figures "put the perpetual or multiple-centuries trust
on a collision course with core principles of trust administration."'
Meanwhile, the authors also noted that the genetic overlap between
transferors and transferees in this variety of perpetual trust would
"[T]he transferor's great-great-great-greatrapidly decrease:
grandchildren .. . are six generations removed from the transferor ...

and [will] have a genetic overlap with the transferor of a mere 1.5625
percent."92
These administrative problems, the authors feared, would
exacerbate the problem that repealing the RAP would subject wealth to
conditions over intervals for which "[n]o transferor has enough
wisdom to make sound dispositions." 3 They note that many devises
created hundreds of years ago "became archaic long ago" and deduced
that "there is reason to suspect that that which is considered
sophisticated today will be considered primitive 360 or more years
from now."94 Reviving the RAP becomes vital, they thus argued,
because "the limit forces full control of encumbered property to be
shifted periodically to the living, free of restrictions imposed by the
original transferor. The living can then use the property as they wish,
including re-transferring it into new trusts with up-to-date

88.
Id. at 114-15 (quoting Waggoner, supm note 26, at 587) (citing SIR ARTHUR
HOBHOUSE, THE DEAD HAND 188 (1880); Leach &Tudor, supmnote 17, § 24.16, at 51).
89. Id.at 115 (quoting SIMPSON, LEADING CASES, supm note 3, at 78).
90. Id at 120 (footnotes omitted). "A 1000-year trust created in 2010 could
terminate in the year 3010 and have millions of beneficiaries." Id at 126.
91.
Id. For a critique of this argument, see mfra notes 216-221 and accompanying
text.
92. Tentative Draft, supm note 19, at 119.
93. Id at 126.
94. Id at 126-27.
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provisions."" "[E]scape clause[s]" such as "nongeneral power[s]
granted to each descendant-beneficiary to appoint trust principal
outright to his or her descendants"" are insufficient substitutes for
"returning full ownership to the control of the living, because outdated
family definitions in the donor's document [could] continue to limit
the permissible appointees of each donee's ... exercise of the
nongeneral power of appointment." Only a revival of the RAP would
suffice.
IV. ADDITIONAL RESPONSES TO THE MOVEMENT TOWARD
ABOLISHING THE RAP
The ALI authors asserted that "[t]he policy issues associated with
allowing perpetual or multiple-centuries trusts [were not] seriously
discussed in the legislatures" prior to movement by states to abrogate
their RAPs." After the movement gained definition, however, a few
scholars did consider the policy considerations underlying these
moves, and proposed their own responses.'
Professors Dukeminier and Krier argued that modem dead-hand
control problems, which they recognized to be the problems of
changed circumstances, unsatisfactory trustees, and the multiplication
of beneficiaries," could be solved by greatly expanding beneficiaries'
powers to replace trustees or to reform or dissolve and distribute the
trust upon unanimous agreement."' Professor Gallanis suggested,
amidst a package of other reforms designed to modernize the law of
95. Id at 127 (footnote omitted) (citing Ruth L. Deech, Lives in Beimg Revive4 97
L.Q.R. 593, 594 (1981)).
96. Id.at 126 n.50.
97. Id.at 127 n.56 (citation omitted).
98. Id at 126.
99. The broad arguments for and against the Rule are summarized in Note, Dynasty
Trusts and the RuleAgainstPerpetuities,116 HARV. L. REv. 2588, 2595-2603 (2003).
100. See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 4, at 1327-39. Professors Dukeminier and
Krier also note that many have considered the issue of "first-generation monopoly"
problematic, but show sympathy to Professor Gallanis's argument that such fears are
overblown, and to Professors Hirsch and Wang's argument that first-generation monopoly
concerns are misplaced in the modem context. See id. at 1322-25 (citing T.P. Gallanis, The
Rule Against Perpetuitiesand the Law Commission&FlawedPhilosophy,59 CAMBRIDGE L.J.
284, 287-90 (2000); Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory oftheDead
Hang 68 IND. L.J. 1, 17-18 (1992)). Dukeminier and Krier further suggest that the real
concern that underlies first-generation worries is that of "the creation of family dynasties,"
but they note that the RAP "has not prevented the creation of family dynasties," and cannot.
Id at 1326-28.
101. See id. at 1327-42; see also Tate, sula note 24, at 597 (characterizing
Dukeminier's and Krier's proposals as "enabling ... trusts to be easily undone after the
beneficiaries known to the settlor have died").
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future interests, placing a "direct limit on the duration of future
interests," with his proposed period being ninety years from the date

the interests are established.102
Similarly, though writing a few years before the RAP-abolition
wave began to gather force, Professors Hirsch and Wang recognized
that "[fjor all [ofj its technical complexity, the [RAP] is curiously
simple minded when it comes to" dealing with the qualitative content
of dead-hand control.'o3 Rather than urging an elimination of the RAP
entirely, however, Hirsch and Wang supported abolition only in the
case of wholly discretionary trusts established in favor of spouses and
descendants-the components of the nuclear family.'" For trusts that
favored different beneficiaries or established less flexible or more
"intrusive" conditions, Hirsch and Wang proposed increasingly strict
perpetuities rules.'
Though deeply interesting, each proposal is flawed. Dukeminier
and Krier's proposal would render any trust condition effectively
meaningless upon the deaths of all beneficiaries alive at the time the
conditional transfer was made, thus defeating donative freedom and
intent at least as effectively as a robust RAP and allowing a specific
generation of beneficiaries to deny late-coming, would-be
beneficiaries the benefits that the transferor had intended for them
without necessarily even objectively bettering their own positions.'o
Gallanis's proposal, though surely simpler than the RAP, similarly
works with the same indiscriminately blunt force as the traditional or
Third Restatement RAPs. Hirsch and Wang's proposal, while more
refined, unnecessarily limits the types of trusts to be excluded from the
Rule and retains and in fact complicates the RAP instead of employing
what this Article suggests to be simpler and more effective responses.
This Article seeks to build on the insights generated by all of
these proposals and to present a RAP alternative that avoids their
design flaws.

102. See TP Gallanis, The Futur of Futume Interests, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 513,
558, 565-66 (2003) (citing Daniel M. Schuyler, Should the Rule Against PerpetriesDiscard
Its Vest., 56 MICH.L.REv. 683, 887 (1958)).
103. Hirsch & Wang, supranote 100, at 54.
104. Id at 51-52. "So long as the scope of discretion is broadly defined, as when the
testator imposes a trust without further managerial trammels or a special power of
appointment that comprehends an entire family, the estate plan lacks arbitrariness and could
even provide some benefits" and so should be excluded from the RAP. Id.
105. Id.at 52-53.
106. Cf id. at 37-38; Gallanis, supa note 100, at 287-90; Jeffrey E. Stake, Darwin,
Donations,and the IllusionofDeadHand Control,64 TuL. L. REv. 705, 739-42 (1990).
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RAP SHOULD Go AND WHAT SHOULD REPLACE IT

If we are to have a RAP, the one proposed by the ALI is certainly
much simplified from the now largely discarded traditional Rule
(though it is not, withal, simpler than the once widely adopted USRAP
Nevertheless, replacing the
ninety-year, wait-and-see version).
effective or outright revocation of the RAP that has been the trend of
the last quarter century with the ALI's Third Restatement RAP would
still involve the reintroduction of a complication that these states have
eliminated. There are thus two general sources of objection to the
ALI's proposed RAP: (1) objections to the reintroduction of anyRAP
given the contours of modem society and property law and
(2) objections or likely obstacles to introducing even the ALI's
relatively simplified and modernized RAP in states that have-for
whatever reasons-eliminated their Rules. Of course, the distinction
between these two categories is not absolute, and there is room to
quibble with the way the various arguments have been divided. Those
quibbles to one side, the first category of critique appears in Subpart A
below, the second in Subpart B.'o"
A.

No RAP Can Efficiently or WiselyAddress ProblemsRelevant to
Modern PropertyLaw andPmcdce

The various arguments posited by the ALI authors in favor of
reviving the RAP have been summarized in detail in Part II.B above.
These arguments are founded on the assertion that the RAP just is not
relevantly about alienability of assets, an assertion that allows the
authors to conclude that it simply does not matter that modem
property holdings can be made freely alienable even if they form the
res of a potentially perpetual conditional gift. The ALI authors express
concerns that RAP abolition involves a betrayal of state obligations to
107. The authors note that the enactment of the GST tax (and exemptions to it) in 1986
provoked the stampede toward abolishing the RAP and that "it appears that transferors had
little desire to take advantage of the absence of a Rule in those states in order to establish
perpetual trusts for their descendants from time to time living forever." Tentative Draft, supm
note 19, at 119 (citing Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Perpetuities or Taxes?
Explabing the Rise of the PerpetualTrust, 27 CARDOzo L. REv. 2465 (2006)). This appears
to be true. See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supm. It also appears to be true, however, that in the
wake of the movement to abolish the RAP, transferor interest in perpetual trusts-for reasons
other than simply achieving happy tax consequences-has awakened. See Tate, supa note
24, at 611-20. Meanwhile, neither the genesis of the evolution away from the RAP nor the
behavior of transferors before that evolution provides any reason not to seize the opportunity
of so many states having abolished or quasi-abolished the RAP to consider whether the RAP
represents a just, wise, and efficient means of achieving appropriate public policy goals in the
modem world. AccordDukeminier & Krier,supra note 4, at 1314-15, 1317.
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the federal treasury and to supposedly inviolate and unchanging
federal tax policy; that truly perpetual, true dynasty trusts would
become unwieldy; that genuine blood connection between transferors
and transferees will grow extremely dilute over time; that plans made
by long-dead ancestors would eventually grow incoherent or
unfulfillable; and that, at all events, long-term dead-hand control
becomes, eventually, inherently illegitimate. " Each of these
arguments is addressed below, as are a variety of additional objections
to resurrection of the RAP
1.

Congress, the States, and Federal Tax Policy

The ALI authors urge the states to revive the RAP as part of an
obligation to facilitate long-fixed and unchanging federal tax policy.
They assert that it has been "longstanding federal tax policy" to
employ federal estate and gift taxes to avoid and break up "large
concentrations of wealth within a relatively small number of family
dynasties and financial institutions."" They further assert that the
states labor under an obligation to support this unchanging tax policy
and that the states abjured that obligation by changing their
perpetuities rules to allow their citizens to take advantage of the
opportunities offered by the GST tax exemption."' Finally, they urge
states to return to their duty to support this supposedly immutable
federal tax policy by reviving their perpetuities rules, and specifically
by adopting the Third Restatement RAP.
This argument suffers from significant flaws. First, as the ALI
authors themselves demonstrate, there can hardly be said to be a
single, unchanging federal tax policy-even with regard to the estate
tax itself. As they note, language in the 1981 Economic Recovery Act
suggested that the estate tax had historically served the function of
"break[ing] up large concentrations of wealth," but it made that
observation in the context of radically increasing the exemption to the
estate and gift taxes in order to protect "estates of a relatively small
size, including those containing family farms or closely held
businesses" that had been brought within the ambit of the estate tax by
inflation and the inaction of previous Congresses.' Moreover, as part
of the 1981 Economic Recovery Act, these changes to estate and gift
108.
109.
110.
111.
97-144, at

See supm Part III.B.
Tentative Draft, supm note 19, at 124 (footnote omitted).
Seeid.
COMM. oN FIN., U.S. SENATE, ECONoMIC RECOVERY TAX Acr OF 1981, S. REP. No.
124 (1981).
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taxes constituted a segment of a sweeping package of tax reforms, one
that both radically altered tax rates and relied on significantly different
theories of taxation, economics, and government than previous tax
packages."' Federal tax policy was subsequently changed in 1982,
1983, 1986 (a significant set of reforms that introduced the GST tax
and its exemption, which in turn set off the movement to abolish the
RAP), 1994, 1997, 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2010."' It will continue to
change in future years."'
There is, then, no consistent federal tax policy, nor anything like
it. Neither is there a consistent policy with regard to the estate tax. As
noted, the 1981 Economic Recovery Act significantly changed the size
of estates to which estate and gift taxes applied. Similar changes have
continued since, culminating in the full elimination of estate and gift
taxes in 2010. That elimination, included in the 2003 tax reform bill,
was designed to sunset in 201 1-for reasons related to internal Senate
rules governing the filibuster and the reconciliation process"'-which
would have revived a fifty-five percent estate and gift tax for estates
worth more than approximately $1 million."' Attempts were made in
2010 to reinstate retroactively the GST tax for 2010, but they were
unsuccessful."' In the closing days of 2010 a new estate tax emerged
at a rate of thirty-five percent to be levied on estates worth more than
$5 million."' This new rate lasts for only two years, though, and the
debate will begin anew in 2012."' All of these changes have been
accompanied by a spirited national debate about the purpose, meaning,
and propriety of the estate (or as its opponents call it, the "death")

112. See generallyHarry L. Gutman, Reforming Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes After
ERTA, 69 VA. L.REv. 1183, 1185 (1983).
113. Jesse Dukeminier, The Uniform StatutoryRule AgahstPerpetuidesand the GST
Tax: New Perilsfor Practitionersand New Opporunaides,30 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 186
(1995); Michael J. Graetz, Tax Reform Umaveling, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 69, 71 (2007)
(demonstrating fairly constant revision); Laura Saunders, Tax Changes for 2011: A
Checklis WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 2011, at B7.
114. See Jon M. Bakija & William G. Gale, Effects of Estate Tax Reform on
CharitableGiving,URB. INST. ISSUEs & OPnoNs, July 2003, at 1.
115. See William G. Gale & Peter R. Orszag, Tax Break: Sunsets in the Tax Code,
TAxNoTEs 1553, 1557 n.4 (2003).
116. See Richard Schmalbeck & Jay A. Soled, Many UnhappyRetuns: Estate Tax
Returns ofMarniedDecedents,21 VA. TAx REV. 361, 368 (2002).
117. See Responsible Estate Tax Act, S. 3533, 11Ith Cong. § 2 (2010).
118. See Saunders, supranote 113.
119. Id
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tax.120 There is no more a fixed, immutable federal estate-tax policy
than there is a fixed federal tax policy generally.
Even if there were a fixed and unchanging federal tax policy,
however, the federal government would not need to rely on the states to
enact it. As the authors themselves recognized, Congress established
the GST tax and its exemptions, can change them when it wishes, and
need not in any way rely on state perpetuities rules in crafting federal
policy or the size of tax exemptions under the GST tax or otherwise. 2'
In fact, the Obama Administration's 2012 budget expressly proposed
limiting the GST tax-exemption period to ninety years without any
reference to state perpetuities rules (though the provision has little
chance of becoming law in 2012).122
Similarly, the states face no moral or legal obligation to assist the
federal government in enacting its tax policy.123 The authors accuse the
states of "exhibit[ing] greater interest in generating trust business for
in-state institutional trustees than in protecting the federal fisc."l24 No
doubt the states were also interested in securing for their citizens (or
citizens doing business in their territory) opportunities that the federal
government had permitted and that citizens considered to be valuable
benefits. 25 Whatever their individual motivations, however, the states
do not exist as subsidiaries of the federal government, but as separate
sovereigns, free to develop policy to aid themselves and their polities. 2 6
The practical structure of American government supports this
theoretical division: state lawmakers owe their maintenance in office
to their voters, not to members of Congress or IRS regulation writers.
Meanwhile, because of the constantly changing nature of federal tax
120. See generally Joel Slemrod & William G. Gale, Rhetoric and Economics hi the
Estate Tax Debate,BROOKINGS (May 22, 2001), http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2001/0522
taxes-gale.aspx.
121. See Tentative Draft, supra note 19, at 124; accord Lawrence W Waggoner,
Congress Should Impose a Two-Genedtion Linit on the GST Exemption: Here Why
(Univ. of Mich. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Working Paper
No. 205, 2010) (recognizing that the federal government has the power to limit GST tax
exemption as it wishes independent of states RAPs).
122. See Laura Saunders, Dynasty Trusts UnderAttack, WALL ST. J., Mar. 5, 2011, at
B9.
123. Cf Dukeminier & Krier, supranote 4, at 1343 ("The short of it is that Congress
has come to be in charge of trust duration. The future of perpetual trusts is in its hands, to be
dealt with through the tax system. The role of the states is to develop affordable means for
modifying and terminating trusts when that is in the best interests of the beneficiaries.").
124. Tentative Draft, supra note 19, at 124.
125. See, eg., Tate, supra note 24, at 611-20.
126. See, eg., U.S. CONsT. amend. X; Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 359 (1943)
("The governments of the states are sovereign within their territory . . . .").
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law and policy, the states could not have crafted their perpetuities rules
coherently to reflect federal tax policy even if they had tried. Rather,
unless the states committed themselves to making regular changes to
their law, they could at best only have frozen in amber some specific
iteration of changing federal policy.
In fact, the entire episode of the GST tax exemption and the
states' response to it demonstrates that the RAP specifically, and state
property law generally, makes an extraordinarily poor backstop to, or
subordinate vehicle of, federal tax policy. A change in federal tax
policy that allows states to create benefits for their citizens and those
doing business in their states by changing state law is, predictably,
quite likely to generate the relevant change. If Congress makes
another such state-law-dependent change, states are likely to act
exactly as they have behaved in abolishing the RAP: they will take
advantage of the opportunity. Unless there exists some vital need to tie
together state property law and federal tax law, they should be kept
separate.
Federal tax policy changes, and it can achieve its changing
purposes without relying on state perpetuities rules. If it becomes
national policy, expressed in federal tax law, to avoid concentrations of
wealth by taxing away significant portions of large estates, federal tax
law can achieve that policy unaided.127 If a state were to decide to
thwart the descent of its own citizens' large estates, it could do so with
state tax policy. State property law, and particularly state perpetuities
rules, neither need nor should be crafted in anticipation of federal tax
law generally, nor with the specific purpose of assisting the federal
government to tax away large estates. The RAP must stand or fall on
the basis of considerations other than those of projected future federal
tax policy or the desire to tax away wealth accumulations at death.
2.

Limits on Inalienability: A Central Historical Justification of the
RAP, Now Eliminated

Despite the ALI's claims to the contrary, the fact that well-crafted
trusts can condition distribution of trust property without limiting
alienability of that property significantly undermines the case for
retaining or reviving the RAP

127. The relative merits or demerits of taxing wealth transfers have been well
rehearsed elsewhere. See, e.g., Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 107, at 2496 n.107
(collecting scholarship).
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The ALI authors make the novel claim that the sole relevant
purpose of the RAP initially was and now remains that of limiting
dead-hand control.'28 The novelty of this claim arises first from the
fact that it contradicts the ALI's own previous positions. In the First
and Second Restatements, the ALI recognized that a fundamental
purpose of the RAP was to "'forward[] the circulation of property' . . .
by prohibiting those categories of future interests which would make
either impossible or improbable sales of land for long periods of
time."29 These Restatements identified limitation of dead-hand control
as a second purpose' and identified a third purpose that might best be
described either as a special case or modernized corollary of deadhand limitation. "' The novelty of the ALI's new position is
compounded by the fact that leading scholars in the field have long
similarly accepted the standard purposes of the RAP, including the
purpose of limiting periods of inalienability of property.'32
In support of their effort to read away alienability as a central
historical purpose of the RAP, the authors relied primarily on A.WB.
Simpson. They claimed that he, in his legal-historical studies, has
"concluded ... that promoting free alienability of land was not the

original purpose of the Rule."' In fact, Simpson appears to have
made no such claim. Rather, he expressly acknowledged that there
always existed for the RAP a "connection with the value of freedom of
128. Tentative Draft, supra note 19, at 113-14.
129. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS ch. 1, at 8-10, intro, note
(1983) (citation omitted); see also RESTATEMENT OF PROP. pt. I, at 2129-33, intro. note (1944).
130. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS ch. 1, at 8, intro. note
("[T]he rule against perpetuities provides an adjustment or balance between the desire of the
current owner of property to prolong indefinitely into the future his control over the
devolution and use thereof and the desire of the person who will in the future become the
owner of the affected land or other thing to be free from the dead hand.").
131. Id. ("[I]t is well established law that the rule against perpetuities applies not only
to limitations made concerning intangibles, such as bonds and shares, but also to limitations
of the beneficial interests under a trust where the trustee has unqualified power to change the
trust res. Both of these situations have one common factor, namely, that a given quantum of
wealth is sought to be committed to the satisfaction of specific and stated ends. Such a
commitment, for its duration, lessens the availability of these assets for the meeting of current
newly arising exigencies."). The RAP's "function has broadened to include the prevention of
limitations which 'freeze' or 'tie up' property for too long a time, even though no specific
thing has been made inalienable, even for a moment." Id
132. See, e g., Dukeminier & Krier, supranote 4, at 1319-39 (dividing the purposes of
the RAP as dealing with the problem of alienability, the problem of first-generation
monopoly, and the problem of duration); Gallanis, supra note 102, at 559 ("[T]he main
purposes of the rule against perpetuities [are] 'to make property more fluid, to free capital
from testamentary restrictions, and to stay the influence of the dead hand."' (quoting
Schuyler, supra note 102, at 922)).
133. Tentative Draft, supra note 19, at 113-14.
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disposition."'" What he did conclude was that the original rationale for
the desire to limit inalienability did not derive from "economic
theor[ies] about the merits of a free market in land" in that
"seventeenth-century lawyers had not read Adam Smith"-an
unsurprising development given that Smith had not yet been born."
Instead, the original rationale for limiting inalienability arose from the
market and social conditions that actually existed in the seventeenth
century: "In aristocratic circles freedom of land disposition was
valued because it enabled the current head of a family to make
appropriate dispositions to perpetuate and aggrandize his family and
its power, as by making alliances by marriage. If his hands were tied,
he could not do this"' 36
In other words, Simpson agreed that the desire to limit the
inalienability of property, particularly land, was a central concern of
the RAP, and a reason for its existence, from the first. It does not-or
should not-come as any surprise that the reasons why society cared
about limits on alienability might have shifted and grown as the
economic foundations and social structure of the society shifted away
from agrarianism and aristocracy and toward commerce, industry, and
equality of station, and as thinkers like Smith penned new theories and
generated new insights about the novel characteristics of this new
society.'"
134. SIMPsoN, LEADING CASES, supra note 3, at 79; SIMPsoN, LEGAL THEORY, supra
note 3, at 159 (noting that originally in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the rule was
"concerned ... with the fettering of the power of alienation").
135. Adam Smith was born on June 16, 1723 in Kirkcaldy, Fife, Scotland. See JOHN
RAE, LIFE OF ADAM SMITH 1 (1895).
136. SIMPsoN, LEADING CASES, supra note 3, at 76, 79 ("Indeed the principal reason a
patriarch might wish to tie up the family lands in perpetuity was fear of folly of his
descendants, who might, if given the power, fritter away the family patrimony in drink or
dissipation, and bring his house to poverty, and his name to dishonour and oblivion."). As
Simpson recognized elsewhere, once the commercial and industrial theories of Smith and
others became current, they were employed as justifications for favoring alienability of land.
See, for example, SIMPSON, LEGAL THEORY, supra note 3, at 143 (quoting JAMES BOSWELL,
THE LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON (B. Birbeck Hill ed., 1887)), in which Boswell reports Dr.
Johnson as having averred:
Entails ... are good, because it is good to preserve in a country, series of men,
whom the people are accustomed to look up to as their leaders. But I am for
leaving a quantity of land in commerce, to excite industry, and [to] keep money in
the country; for, if no land were to be bought in the country, there would be no
encouragement to acquire wealth, because a family could not be founded there.
Id.
137. Review of another source relied on by the ALI authors, Haskins, supra note 3,
noted in Tentative Draft, supra note 19, at 113-14 nn. 1, 4, makes this point in a slightly
different way. Haskins argues that contrary to previously accepted historical accounts, the

HeinOnline -- 86 Tul. L. Rev. 585 2011-2012

586

TULANELA WREVIEW

[Vol. 86:559

The very structure of the traditional RAP similarly undermines
the authors' claims that inalienability limitation did not serve as a
central and abiding rationale for the Rule. They claim that the
traditional Rule's focus on the time at which future interests might vest
"has some merit but is not well aligned with the purpose of the Rule,
which is to limit dead-hand control."'0 8 Their proposed Rule, they
explain, focuses on the time of termination of the trust rather than the
time of vesting of contingent interests, "because the time of
termination is when the property comes under the control of the
ultimate beneficiaries."' The authors fail to consider that a vesting
rule makes much more sense if one of the traditional purposes of the
RAP was in fact limiting periods of inalienability. Once all legal
future interest holders were identified, they could alienate property by
common agreement.'4 0 As long as contingent future interests lie
unvested, though, such common agreement was impossible.
Of course, this inalienability-limiting rationale for the RAP has
essentially grown moot. Trustees generally have the power to sell any
given item of property included in a trust (and most states that permit

seventeenth-century England in and for which the Duke ofNorfolkh Case was penned was
not yet a realm "of capitalist triumph." Id at 23. Rather, the case represented "the climax of
a long struggle between the conveyancers who wanted more freedom for the landed classes to
control their estates and the royal judges who stood firm against these efforts for centuries,"
in which "[t]he conveyancers and their clients, not the judges, were the ultimate victors." Id.
at 21. As such, he suggests, the rule handed down in Norfolk Case would better be
characterized as "a rule ofperpetuities, not a rule agarnstperpetuities."Id (emphasis added).
To the extent all of this is true, it reveals not that limitations on alienability were not a central
and vital justification of the rule against perpetuities as it developed, but that the specific
details of Norfolkh Case are irrelevant to modem conditions and any consideration of the
Rule Against Perpetuities in the United States. For surely, in both Britain and the United
States, the eighteenth century would see capitalism blossom even if the seventeenth century
did not, and certainly the United States never had any sort of landed nobility obliged to
consider-or be driven by-the considerations Haskins claims were at the heart of Norfolkh
Case. And it is not the nebulous rule of Norfolk's Casethat informs current debate, but the
strict, detailed, ponderous forms of Gray's life-in-being-plus-twenty-one-years-rule, which
was articulated at the end of the nineteenth century, far into the merchant's and the
industrialist's ascendancy. And that rule, it is universally acknowledged, has always
survived-or fallen--with limitations on inalienability as a central (and arguably necessary)
pillar.
138. Tentative Draft, supra note 19, at 131.
13 9. Id
140. See, eg., Candler S. Rogers, Removal ofFutureInterestEncumbrances-Saleof
the Fee Simple Estate, 17 VAND. L. REv. 1437, 1440-41 (1964). The same is true of equitable
interests (namely, trust-beneficiary interests) in England and was true as well of equitable
interests in the United States through the Reconstruction Era, essentially until the ClaIN
decision. See Gregory S. Alexander, The DeadHandand the Law of Trusts i the Nineteenth
Century,37 STAN. L. REv. 1189, 1226-27 (1985).
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perpetual trusts require that the trustee enjoy such authority). 4 ' Minor
adjustments to laws governing trusts and to default rules for reading
conditional grants outside of trusts could make this alienability power
virtually universal.'42 It does not follow from this fact that the
importance of inalienability limitation as an original and sustaining
justification for the RAP merely falls away, however. Rather, to the
extent that the RAP existed as a bar against the problem of perpetual
(or even long-term) inalienability, its services are no longer required.
3.

The Dead Hand: A Critically Diminished Concern That a RAP
Can No Longer Coherently Address

With the inalienability-limitation justification for the Rule no
longer operative, the RAP's revival must be justified either on the
grounds that it is the best (or only) way to limit pernicious dead-hand
control, or because estate and gift administration will spiral hopelessly
out of control without RAP restrictions. The administrative issue is
considered below.'43 The dead-hand control issue must be divided into
two parts. Before determining whether the RAP serves a useful role in
limiting dead-hand control, it must be determined whether what is
generally called dead-hand control is genuinely problematic-or is
even, in any real sense, dead-hand control.
As Professor Simpson has noted, "The world in which the rule
evolved was that of the landed aristocracy and gentry" governed by
"the conventions of upper-class land owning society."'" It existed to
place limits on the length of time that "the patriarch ... could make

binding dispositions of the family estates."' 4 5 Dead-hand control
presents a very real problem in a land-based economy, especially the
land-based economy of a small, island nation where land is not only
quite scarce, but also provides a significant basis for political and
social power.'46 Precious little more of it can be manufactured.'4 7 If
previous generations have entailed or otherwise devised the whole
stock of land into dim perpetuity, it is fair to suggest that they have
"tie[d] up all existing capital for an indefinitely long period of time,"
141. SeeDukeminier & Krier, supm note 4, at 1321.
142. SeeifmaPart VI.D.
143. See nfranotes 216-221 and accompanying text.
144. SImPsON, LEADING CASES, supra note 3, at 76.
145. Id.
146. See, e.g., Haskins, supra note 3, at 20-2 1.
147. See, eg., Scott Andrew Shepard, Adverse Possession,Private-Zoning Waiver &
Desuetude: Abandonment & Recapture of Liberty andProperty Interests 44 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORm 557 (2011) (considering meager reclamation options available and historical record).
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so that "future generations will have nothing to dispose of by will
except what they have saved from their own income; and the property
which each generation enjoys will already have been disposed of by
ancestors long dead."'48
While this argument makes significant sense in a society in
which the primary store of wealth is essentially fixed, it makes far less
sense in a society in which wealth is not a fixed stock, but is fluid, so
that each generation can produce its own wealth without regard to
whether or what sorts of inheritance they receive.
If wealth is a constant, and one generation monopolizes the benefits of
bequeathing it, subsequent generations suffer a clear cost in the loss of
those same benefits. That cost, borne forever, must outweigh the
benefit to the one generation that imposes it. But in modem times,
when each generation can produce its own wealth, the loss of
opportunity to bequeath pior wealth does not clearly crowd later
comers to their overall detriment.149
In a very real sense, a grantor's control of fully alienable wealth in
a fluid-wealth society constitutes so different a species of "control"
that it requires a designation different than that of "dead-hand control."
This is because classic dead-hand control had two components. First,
classic dead-hand control exerted control over the wealth that was
subject to the conditions established by the grantor. Thus, for instance,
if a grantor left that sturdy old manse, Blackacre, to "my sons who
shall conform to the Established Church," the grantor has exerted
control over how the wealth should be distributed or employed. But
classic dead-hand control worked to control not only the distribution of
the wealth subject to the conditions, but also the lives of the parties
subject to the grant. If wealth in a society lay in land, and the land was
parceled out such that there was essentially no more to be had (and,
besides, nothing with which to purchase it without any wealth-wealth
that was of course denominated in the currency of land), then the
conditions set by grantors over access to land effectively became
complete controls over the lives of descendants. The descendants
either did their ancestors' bidding or forfeited their access to the means
and modes of wealth, social standing, and political power.
Modem "dead-hand control" exhibits only the first of these two
types of control. A modem settlor leaves in trust her fortune "to those
of my children who graduate from law school." The settlor has
148. Lewis M. Simes, Is the Rule Against PerpetuitiesDoomed? The "Wait and See"
Doctbme, 52 MICH. L. REv 179, 191 (1953).
149. Hirsch & Wang, supranote 100, at 17-18 (footnotes omitted).
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certainly established the conditions under which her fortune will be
distributed. She has not, though, in any meaningful sense, exerted the
second kind of control. By locking up some or all of her fortune, she
has not effectively controlled her descendants' lives, but merely made
one of their options relatively more attractive. Her descendants remain
free to pay their own way to medical school; to become painters; or to
go into business, amass their own fortunes, and then establish trusts
that pay out only to descendants who have nothing whatever to do with
the law. Some empathy might rise for any irritation felt by any of the
settlor's descendants who preferred some path other than law school.
It would be deeply strange, though, to call the conditional opportunity
established by the settlor "control" of the descendants' lives, especially
in a society such as that of the United States, wherein descendants
have no claim of right to any transmission of wealth from ancestors in
the first place.'so (The claim of "control" becomes even less tenable if
the conditional gift arises in favor of nondescendants. If our settlor
were to have left her conditional gift "to the descendants of my friend
James," clearly her beneficence would in no way have controlled
James' descendants lives, but merely have provided them a wonderful
additional opportunity)
Modem conditional gifts differ from classic dead-hand control in
another important way. If land is the primary store of wealth, and
wealth is essentially a fixed stock, then only the "conqueror" of the
land has any moral claim to place any conditions on its transmission.
The "creator" of the wealth, or the ancestor who originally brought the
land into the family and thus elevated or secured the familial status,
could reasonably have set permanent conditions on its passage. For all
lineal descendants after that ancestor, though, any attempt to set
permanent conditions on the land's descent would have represented a
moral overreach; by what right might a current steward of ancestral
lands secured by another set perpetual conditions, and thereby control
the futures of later stewards whose claims to the land and its
emoluments were neither greater nor smaller than his own? In a world
of fixed-stock wealth, such an overreach had, as has been considered,
profound implications. As a result, the law rightly bounded such an

150. Cf Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 717-18 (1987). The United States has broad
authority to regulate descent and devise, but the Takings Clause is implicated if rights of
descent and devise are wholly terminated. Id. Notably, a right to receive property from
ancestors is not suggested or implicated. Id.
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interim steward to "making prudent provision for people he knew, and
for contingencies he could anticipate as likely to occur.""'
Modem conditional gifts, made in a world of a fluid and
expandable stock of wealth, place the grantor in a vastly different
situation. First, the grantor is much more likely to have been the
creator of the wealth being conditionally transmitted. Such wealth
creators surely enjoy the moral authority to place conditions by which
potential beneficiaries might enjoy the fruits of their wealth creation.
With regard to later-generation transmitters of an ancestor's wealth,
two arguments can be made. It might be argued that recipients of
wealth generated by others have no right to add conditions to the
further transmission of that wealth. This argument would read into
unconditional grants of wealth an implied condition that the wealth be
transferred (presumably) to the recipients' descendants without
condition. On the other hand, it might also be argued that if the
wealth-creating ancestor placed no conditions on the transmission of
wealth to descendants, then those descendants are free to do with that
wealth what they wish-including themselves transmitting it with
conditions. The latter is a cleaner solution, because it does not require
reading implied (if negative) conditions into previous grantors' grants;
it recognizes that the original grantor could have included, but did not,
an explicit condition that the property be passed along to some certain
future takers; it avoids the obligation to guess the original grantor's
intent about whom the implied future takers should be; and it cuts
down on litigation. Moreover, it would be odd if a recipient of wealth
without conditions could give away that wealth to charity or to a
neighbor, or could bum it in a bonfire, or could simply spend it all, but
could not make a conditional gift of it to any qualifying future takers of
her choice. (Proposed rules responding to both of these interpretations
are considered below."') Whichever interpretation is preferred, the
placement of conditions on recently generated wealth in a world of
fluid wealth creation runs afoul of few of the neutral-stewardship
concerns that appended to conditions placed on a family's sole source
of wealth by generations subsequent to the wealth conqueror in a world
in which more wealth could not realistically be created.
Modem dead-hand control thus only faintly resembles, and exerts
much less actual control than, classic dead-hand control. The amount
of control that is exerted, meanwhile, has in a very real sense been
151.
152.

SIMPsoN, LEADING CASES, supranote 3, at 77.
See infrd Part VI.D.
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earned. Justifying a revival of the RAP on the basis of its value as a
dead-hand control limitation, then, requires demonstrating that this
earned, very limited control nevertheless proves so pernicious that it
should be curtailed at the cost of inflicting a RAP (and, specifically,
the Third Restatement's RAP) on society.
In fact, though, the control exerted by the modem dead-hand
proves mostly beneficial, or at least neutral. As this Article
demonstrates directly below, the conditions levied by transferors can
be divided into essentially two types: principal-preserving conditions
Neither type proves anything like
and gate-keeping conditions.
categorically pernicious. In fact, no principled objection can be raised
to principal-preserving conditions as such. And while some public
policy objections might reasonably be raised to a few narrow and
seldom-invoked varieties of gate-keeping conditions, the RAP does not
provide a coherent means of restricting such arguably objectionable
conditions. The right response would be to ban the objectionable
subcategory of conditions from the beghning,not to sunset them some
decades or generations in the future. Meanwhile, even if the RAP did
provide a coherent means of restricting inappropriate conditions, it is
incapable of distinguishing good or neutral conditions from bad ones,
and so is a fatally flawed vehicle.
This leaves the RAP revivers a single argument: that conditions
that start out as stable and reasonable will inevitably-or at least with
significant regularity-dissolve into instability and incoherence in the
face of changing social, economic, and other conditions, thus
necessitating (or at least justifying) a revival of the RAP. But this is
wrong. If the res of the transferred interest is freely alienable, then it
cannot be expected with any confidence that principal-preserving
conditions attached to a transfer will become either unstable or out of
touch, or less effectively advance social welfare ends than trust
distribution. Meanwhile gate-keeping conditions-namely, conditions
that texture either the pool of beneficiaries or the conditions under
which a pool of beneficiaries may take-are generally either positive
or benign when they are established. Concerns about conditions
growing out of step with social, technological, or legal realities as time
passes are overblown, but to the extent they are real, they can in vast
part be dealt with by small alterations to the rules employed when
interpreting conditional gift provisions. The few that grow truly
153. Of course, if the transferor has placed no conditions on the transfer, then the
transferor has exerted no dead-hand control, so neither the issue, nor the specter of the RAP
arises.
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noxious over time can be revised on public policy grounds when actual
noxiousness arises.
In other words, there is no reason to believe that all or even most
conditions will deteriorate over time so that they will no longer
faithfully and stably effect the nonoffensive will of the transferor over
time, and there is good reason to think that most of them will not. The
RAP cannot distinguish between stable and continuingly appropriate
conditions, on one hand, and unstable conditions on the other, any
more than it can distinguish between good and bad conditions, and
there are other, far more nuanced means of dealing with those rare
conditions that prove unstable or that grow problematic with time. For
these reasons, the revival of the RAP cannot be justified on the
grounds of the potential long-term effects of either principalpreserving or gate-keeping conditions, either. All of this is
demonstrated in detail in the two Subparts that immediately follow.
a.

Principal-Preserving Conditions

The first type of transfer conditions may be referred to as
principal-preserving conditions:
conditions that require regular
distributions of interest or income to a named set of beneficiaries, but
that reserve the principal so that it may generate income to be granted
to later beneficiaries. It is difficult to formulate coherent objections to
this type of condition. As has been noted, no beneficiaries enjoy a
legal claim to transfers from others. 1' Thus, the fact that some
beneficiaries may be getting a smaller benefit than they would be
getting if both interest and principal were distributed to them cannot
form a cognizable complaint, as the beneficiaries never had any
meaningful claim to anything, much less to more. It has been argued
that descendants should, as they do in civil law countries and in
Louisiana, "' have a legal entitlement to some portion of their
ancestors' estates,"' but this is really an argument for wholly reworking

154. This statement is admittedly somewhat tautological: parties that do enjoy a legal
claim to transfers from others are not "beneficiaries"; they are, broadly, creditors. But the
point is that grantees of gifts, in whatever form-including those who take from ancestors'
estates-are not creditors; they have no legal claim on their ancestors' or other grantors'
largesse.
155. See generallyThomas B. Lemann, In Defense ofForcedHebship, 52 TuL. L. REV.
20 (1977).
156. See, e g., Jonathan G. Blattmachr, Reduchg Estateand rust Liigation Thmugh
Disclosure,in Ternrem Clauses,Mediationand Arbitration,9 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL.
237, 239 n.8 (2008).
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the American law of estate descent,'" not an argument against longlasting, principal-preserving conditions within the American system.
Some scholars have argued against principal-preserving
conditions on the grounds that trustees are too conservative in their
investment strategies, so that principal-preserving conditions create a
net social-wealth cost.' In fact, though, concerns about inefficient
principal-preserving conditions can be addressed without reference to
a RAP and cannot effectively be addressed by a Rule. First, to the
extent that trustees find themselves free of alienability restrictions,'
they are essentially free to invest as the transferor would, except insofar
as they are bound by a general obligation to be prudent."' While this
obligation presumably stops trustees from making highly speculative
investments, speculative investments by their nature produce widely
variant results. To the extent that prudential investment rules have
resulted in subpar returns,' they can be-and have been-steadily
revised without in any way relying on or implicating a RAP' Second,
one cannot make this social-wealth-cost claim without positing a
credible baseline of what the beneficiaries would have done with the
principal had it been transferred to them instead of being preserved to
create income for future beneficiaries. It is not credible to suggest that
all such principal distributees will invest all of the principal transferred
to them at a return universally higher than that achieved by the trustee.
Some may do that, of course, but some will invest less wisely, and
make a lower return. Some will spend or squander, rather than
investing, some significant portion of the principal distributed to
them.' To the extent they do this, the prudent trustee's investments
seem clearly superior. Surely, the parties that would have been interest

157. See, eg., id at 239.
158. See, e.g., Paul G. Haskell, A Proposalfor a Simple and Socially Effective Rule
Against Perpetuities,66 N.C. L. REv 545, 558-59 (1988).
159. See supra Part VA.2 (alienability no longer a concern).
160. Trustees have historically been bound tightly to conservative investment
strategies-first by lists of properties in which they could invest, and later by the "prudent
man" standard. See, e.g., Stephen P. Johnson, Trustee Investment: The PrudentPersonRule
or Modern Portfolio Theory You Make the Choice,44 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1175, 1176 (1993).
These restrictions have been significantly relaxed in recent years with the rise of the prudent
investor standard. See id at 1177, 1182-83.
161. See, e.g., John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Market Funds and TrustInvestment Law: 11 2 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 1, 2-3 (1977); John H. Langbein & Richard A.
Posner, The Revolution in TrustInvestment Law, 62 A.B.A. J. 887 (1976).
162. See Johnson, supranote 160, at 1182-83.
163. In fact, as noted below, the notion that a RAP will serve to break up large
concentrations of family wealth relieson such malinvestment and squandering.
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beneficiaries of the trust but for the disgorgement of principal would
think so.
Meanwhile, note how this argument flies directly in the face of a
second argument raised by opponents of perpetual principalpreserving conditions, including the ALI authors: that such perpetual
principal-preserving trusts will facilitate the emergence of ultrawealthy
dynasties and trust managers who exert too much market power by
their control of too-massive trusts.'" As discussed above, the tax code
provides the only appropriate venue for establishing policy about the
descent of inherited wealth."' This argument further demonstrates
why. The only effect that a RAP has on a principal-preserving trust is
eventually to require that the principal be distributed to some set of
then-current beneficiaries, with the exact set of beneficiaries
established by the mechanism of the relevant RAP. This being the
case, there is only one presumption under which it is true both that
family dynasties actually constitute a meaningful concern and that a
RAP can have any dampening effect on the development of such
dynasties. The presumption is that the beneficiaries, upon receiving
the disbursement, will make matenlaly less-productive use of the
principal than had the trustee. Only if the transferees who receive the
principal squander it, or invest it poorly, will the putative dynasties
have less capital-and less opportunity to create or maintain the
164. See Tentative Draft, supra note 19, at 123-24 ("The trustee . .. can be authorized
to hire sophisticated investment managers and invest in assets not traded in the public
securities markets, assets such as hedge funds, private equity, venture capital funds, and real
estate.... Potentially, the perpetual or multiple-centuries trust movement could, over time,
lead to large concentrations of wealth within a relatively small number of family dynasties
and financial institutions . . . ."(footnotes omitted)). The specific concern about too-powerful
private dynasty-trust managers exerting too much control over the economy cannot be taken
seriously unless the proponents of the argument propose as well the dissolution of pensionmanagement funds, including government-held pension-management funds. Managers of
these funds in the United States alone controlled $9.03 trillion in assets at the end of 2008
(down nineteen percent from the end-of-2007 total, retreating to or below end-of-2005 totals),
constituting more than half of all fiduciary assets and dwarfing entirely the funds controlled
by trusts for private individuals or families, which stood at somewhere in the neighborhood of
a trillion dollars over the same general period, represented only six percent of fiduciary
assets, and were spread across approximately 1.1. million accounts of approximately $1
million in size, on average. See 2009 Global Pension Assets Study, WATSON WYATr
WORLDWIDE 9 (Jan. 2009), http://www.apapr.ro/images/BIBLIOTECA/statisticiglobale/
ww/o20assets%202009.pdf (assets controlled by pension funds); 2005 FDIC Trust Report,
FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. (Dec. 5, 2007), http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/trust/report

2005.html; see also Adam Corey Ross, Special Report: Best and Worst State Funded
Pensions,FIScAL TIMES, Mar. 24, 2011, at 1. New York State's pension fund, the secondlargest in the country, alone controls $237 billion in assets, while Wisconsin's fund, ninth
largest, controls nearly $79 billion. Id.
165. SeeLiebman, supmnote 41.
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dynasty-than before the distribution. If the transferees invest it as
well as the trustee had, then the dynasty's wealth has not been
diminished; if they invest more successfully, the dynasty has grown
wealthier. '" This means, though, that the RAP addresses the
"problem" of dynastic accumulations of wealth only and only to the
extent that it diminishes overall social welfare by championing and
facilitating the squandering or malinvestment of capital. Such a move
is by definition inefficient and pretty patently unjust as well.
Professors Hirsch and Wang concur that principal-preserving
trusts should be freed from any RAP restrictions, but only if the
testator "simply designate[s] the beneficiaries of a gratuity and then
delegate[s] to someone else the responsibility of parceling it out
among them."' It is unnecessary, though, to add this limitation on the
types of gifts that should be excluded from the RAP The very
conditional transfer that Hirsch and Wang most approve includes both
a principal-preserving condition and a "positive" gate-keeping
condition, in that it circumscribes (as all conditional gifts must) the
class of potential beneficiaries. A direction from a testator that all
members of a beneficiary class should take equally (or in some fixed
shares not alterable by a trustee) is in effect a "negative" gate-keeping
condition, one that keeps all beneficiaries "in," and at a fixed rate. For
the reasons discussed next, gate-keeping conditions, whether positive
or negative, no more justify RAP revival than do principal-preserving
ones.
b.

Gate-Keeping Conditions

The second type of transfer conditions could be called principlepreserving conditions, as they serve to texture access to the transferor's
largesse on the basis of some principle or in the advancement of some
purpose that the transferor considers important. For the sake of clarity,
however, they are probably better described as gate-keeping
conditions.
Even were the gate-keeping conditions actually imposed by
transferors universally morally abhorrent, such repugnance would not
166. There is a second presumption under which the RAP could diminish the prospect
of family dynasties, but it undermines entirely the concern about family dynasties. If, after
the principal distribution, the transferees, regardless of how successfully they invested the
principal distribution, gave it away to beneficiaries "outside" the family dynasty, then they
would thereby diminish the wealth retained by the dynasty. But exactly to the extent that
transferees do make that choice, they have also rendered hollow the initial concern about
wealthy families being driven to establish and maintain family dynasties at all.
167. Hirsch & Wang, supra note 100, at 38-39 (footnote omitted).
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counsel applying a RAP to them. Rather, it would demand the
complete prohibition of gate-keeping conditions on the grounds of
public policy. Most gate-keeping conditions, though, prove morally
admirable, or at very worst neutral."' Many transferors require that
would-be beneficiaries complete school, or work to contribute to their
own support, or otherwise behave as responsible members of society.'
Others limit access to trust property to potential beneficiaries who
demonstrate a need for support.o Such conditions can raise no moral
objections."'
The ALI authors do raise what might be called a practical
objection to spendthrift clauses, which allow would-be beneficiaries to
access a trust only to pay certain necessities and permit access to those
beneficiaries' creditors only for the same purposes.'72 They and others
express wariness about spendthrift trusts out of fear that, as Professor
168. One might argue that it is morally wrong that some members of society have a
private stock of wealth to rely on that others have not, or financial incentives to strive for that
others lack. But such arguments are, again, cries against inheritance of wealth, not in favor of
eventual application of a RAP.
169. See, e.g., Note, Conditions on Testamentary Giffs as a Device of Control, 36
COLUM. L. REV. 439, 453-54 (1936). Embracing a RAP on this ground would require
embrace as well of the underlying premise: that tools for encouraging productivity (or
learning, or thrift) in future generations ought to be knocked out of the hands of the wealthy
exactly because the wealthy will not remain wealthy as long if the descendants of wealth
creators are in essence subsidized to live lives of sloth. This is a rather unlovely proposition.
170. See, e.g., Scott Gardner, Comment, Supplemental Needs Trusts. A Means To
Conserve Family Assets and Provide Increased Quality of Life for the Disabled Family
Member, 32 DUQ. L. REv. 555, 556 (1994).
171. Permitting facially morally neutral conditions to flourish can have materially
morally positive effects even aside from the moral value of maximizing non-harm-generating
transferor freedom. This is illustrated by the fact that an additional practical effect of the
Third Restatement RAP will be to reduce charitable giving. An illustration provided by the
ALI authors themselves demonstrates this point. See Tentative Draft, supra note 19, illus. 3,
at 155. A transferor makes a conditional gift to a school district if the property is used for
school purposes; if it is not, it goes instead to the transferor's descendants. Because the
remainder here is not charitable, the gift of the remainder is not exempted from the RAP As
a result, the condition "if the land is used for school purposes" is defeated at the end of the
perpetuities period, and the gift becomes absolute. Two objections to this result arise. First,
this was rather obviously not the transferor's intent. Why not transfer to descendants when
the incentive to retain the gift as school land disappears? If the answer is that it is
administratively impractical, that problem can be dealt with by the rule of administrative
efficiency proposed infra Part VI.A and does not require a RAP. Meanwhile, if the transferor
is aware that her condition will be terminated at a certain time, and if she obviously cares
about this condition being followed, the fact that the condition will eventually evaporate will
make her some increment less likely to make the charitable gift at all (because if she cared
not at all about the existence of the condition, she would not have created a conditional gift,
but would have made an outright gift, perhaps including some precatory, nonbinding
language about her wishes for how the gift would be used).
172. See Tentative Draft, supia note 19, at 123-24; William H. Wicker, Spendthrif
Trusts, 10 GoNz. L. REv. 1 (1974).
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Gray so pungently put it, the effect of "[tihe general introduction of
spendthrift trusts would be to form a privileged class, who could
indulge in every speculation, could practi[c]e every fraud, and yet,
provided they kept on the safe side of the criminal law, could [yet] roll
in wealth.""' To the extent that spendthrift clauses create these
problems for creditors, though, the clauses create problems
immediately-not some number of generations in the future. If the
rules governing spendthrift clauses need to be reformed, they should
be. A RAP, whether that of the Third Restatement or some other
version, though, does not do that reforming work-so undesirable
practical side effects of spendthrift clauses provide no justification for
reviving the RAP.
Other gate-keeping conditions are less obviously noble, but still
cannot be considered meaningfully problematic. Consider again our
transferor above who made a conditional gift permitting would-be
beneficiaries to take "if they graduate from law school." The
insistence on law school graduation in this example speaks perhaps
more to the transferor's personal predilection than to straightforward
nobility, but the grant certainly does no positive harm. In fact,
according to those who worry about the creation of family dynasties,
such a gate-keeping condition, however idiosyncratic, serves a positive
good: it ensures that some-perhaps many-of the members of these
potential dynasties will be denied access to ancestral largesse and will
have to make their way in the world like everyone else." 4
Finally, some gate-keeping conditions raise some legitimate
public policy concerns. In a recent example, an Illinois testator made
his fortune available to his descendants, conditional upon their
marrying within his faith.' This condition placed no bar whatsoever
on the descendants' religious affiliation or their freedom to marry; it
just made a gift available upon marriage consistent with the
condition.'" The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the gift, largely on
173.

JoHN CIPMPAN GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY

§ 262

(1883).
174. Such conditions could only contribute to the development and maintenance of
family dynasties if the conditions successfully created incentives for the beneficiaries to
achieve levels of productivity and wealth generation that they would not have achieved but for
the existence of the conditions. But, as with the disbursement-to-foster-squandering
presumption considered above in the context of principal-preserving conditions, see supra
Part VA.3.a, neither efficiency nor justice will permit objecting to gate-keeping conditions
precisely on the grounds that such conditions promote positive and productive contribution to
society.
175. See In re Estate of Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d 888 (Ill. 2009).
176. Seeid.at891.
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these grounds.'" Many people would not inflict such a condition on
their descendants, and those same people may consider such a
condition morally unjustifiable. The proper response for those who
hold such an opinion, however, and who would take the further step of
banning this or other gate-keeping conditions that they find morally
repugnant, is not to advocate a revival of the RAP, which would do
nothing to remove the gate-keeping condition-and thus the relevant
incentive structure-for generations of the testator's descendants.
Rather, as with the spendthrift clauses considered above, the relevant
and coherent response would be to seek legislative or judicial rejection
of the specific, narrow varieties of gate-keeping conditions found
objectionable.'78
The initial content of gate-keeping conditions neither does nor
can provide any justification for reviving the RAP. All that remains to
supporters of RAP revival, including the ALI, is the argument that
gate-keeping conditions that pass muster when initially established are
likely over time to begin to chafe-to fail the "real" will of the
transferor in ways that deeply offend public policy. ' For these
reasons, the best response to the potential chafing is to establish a
blanket rule cutting off all such conditions at a given time. This
argument, though, is based on a pair of false assumptions: that
testators are incapable of or unwilling to establish gate-keeping
conditions that are in their terms responsive to the social, economic,
and other changes the future holds and that the law is incapable,
without a RAP, of dealing with inflexible gate-keeping conditions in a
coherent manner when and if the need arises.
In support of their proposition, the ALI authors concern
themselves particularly with obsolete family class-gift designations.'
They claim that "no perpetual or multiple-[generation] trust drafted
today will be able to anticipate concepts of family and descent as they
change and adjust over vast intervals in the future" and that "[n]o trust
drafted in 1650 or earlier could have contained provisions anticipating
177. See id at 897.
178. This is just what the Pennsylvania Court did with a materially similar provision in
1974. See ln re Estate of Coleman, 317 A.2d 631 (Pa. 1974). For consideration of where and
how this public policy line has been and should be drawn, see Alan Newman, The Intention
of the Seltor Under the Uniform Tnst Code: Whose PropertyIs It, Anyway?, 38 AKRON L.
REv. 649, 681-84, 689-92 (2005).
179. See Tentative Draft, supm note 19, § 27.2. When the Third Restatement's RAP
attaches, "the court shall modify a disposition. . . in a manner that most closely approximates
the transferor's manifested plan of distribution." Id. at 153.
180. Seeid at 127.
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the possibility of adopted children, children of assisted reproduction,
or children born to a surrogate mother, much less second-parent
adoptions or posthumously conceived children."'"' The ALI authors'
concerns, though, are misplaced. Modem drafting talent and the
relevant pool of precedent are both more supple and clever than the
ALI authors suppose, and to the extent they are not, these concerns are
easily dealt with by the adoption of one or both of a pair of interpretive
presumptions considered below.
First, the laws of the past do not-any more than the laws of
today-prove categorically restrictive of developments that those laws
did not anticipate. Heirs and descendants in England of 1650 were
defined as "[a]ll persons born within marriage ... unless there is an
apparent impossibility that they ... be generated by the husband."'82

Thus, even the strictest seventeenth-century interpretations of "heirs"
and "descendants" would plainly include many of those that the ALI
authors worry about being excluded, such as children produced from
the material of both spouses by the application of assisted reproduction
technologies during a valid marriage.
Moreover, the courts of that era, in striving to find legitimacy
wherever they could, sometimes invoked fictions of marital parentage
where the facts pointed incontrovertibly in another direction. A
married traveler went abroad for three years, returning to discover
"his" month-old daughter.'
The townspeople, of course, were
perfectly aware that the daughter was not his, and yet the court found
her legitimate and able to inherit, "for the privacies of man and wife
can not be known, and he may have come . . . by night" and

engendered the plaintiff." Similar fictions were applied even when it
was perfectly clear that neither the husband nor the wife were the
natural parents of the child, the "strong inclination" of the law being
"to treat as legitimate any child whom the husband has down to his
death accepted as his own and his wife's child, even though proof be
forthcoming that it is neither the one nor the other."' This fictionalready extant in the seventeenth century-would prove broad enough
to allow nimble modem courts, were they faced with the task of
interpreting a trust of 1650s vintage, to permit adoptive children-at
181. Id. at 128 (footnote omitted); see alsoWaggoner, supranote 43, at 9-12.
182. 1 MATfHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW 749 (1832); see also 4
CHARLES VINER, A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT OF LAW AND EQUITY 215 (2d ed. 1748) (stating a
child born in wedlock is legitimate unless special circumstances are demonstrated).
183. See 2 POLLOCK& MAITLAND, supm note 10, at 398.
18 4. Id.
185. Id.at 398-99.
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least children held out by married couples as their own-as "heirs"
and "descendants." The fiction is even broad enough to include samesex couples, at least in states where such couples may marry: a
married couple holds out a child as its own; the law refuses to question
the presumption, even though the child is manifestly not the issue of
both spouses.'" Why should it matter to our modem court that some
particulars of the couple's identity might have startled the courts that
had developed the doctrine? Thus, even if a settlor in 1650 had
included a provision requiring that his beneficiaries forever be defined
"according to the definitions now in force," then many of the
redefinitions of the terms that have occurred over the intervening
centuries would still have been accommodated. The ALI authors'
concerns about staleness, then, prove significantly overstated from the
outset.
Additionally, the authors need not worry that long-term trusts will
be (or have been) incapable of anticipating changing concepts of
family and descent: examples exist of testators having rendered the
gate-keeping conditions attached to their gifts amenable to changing
constructions of family and inheritance law,' and the language to
achieve such purposes is hardly obscure."' Perhaps no settlor in 1650
could have anticipatedexactly some of these developments (though it
is worth noting, for instance, that anyone in 1650 with even a passing
knowledge of the Roman imperial dynasty-a thing that Shakespeare
demonstrates was generally available "-had some sense of the
institution of adoption,' and that while the English system largely
rejected formal adoption, the institution was contemporaneously alive
and well on the European continent."') There is, though, no reason
whatsoever that any settlor in 1650 would have needed to anticipate
such developments with any precision in order to create a trust that
186. See Tentative Draft, supra note 19, at 128 n.60.
187. See, eg., Minary v. Citizens Fid. Bank & Trust Co., 419 S.W2d 340 (Ky. 1967).
A decedent settlor establishes a trust, then subject to the Kentucky RAP, and declares that
upon termination, the trust "shall be distributed to my then surviving heirs, according to the
laws of descent and distribution then in force in Kentucky." Id. at 341.
188. See id. at 341. Establishing a trust that is open, subject to whatever other gatekeeping conditions might append, to the relevant beneficiary class (for example, heirs,
descendants, cousins) "according to the laws of descent and distribution then in force" does
quite nicely. Id.
189. See, e.g., WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JuLIus CAESAR act 3, sc. 2.
190. See, eg., Leo Albert Huard, The Law ofAdoption: Ancient and Modern, 9 VAND.
L. REv 743, 744-45 (1956); K.H. Waters, The Second Dynasty ofRome, 17 PHOENIX 198,
198-99 (1963).
191. Huard, supa note 190, at 745-47.
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would remain coherent and nonobjectionable today. Had testators in
that era designated the beneficiary class (namely, "my descendants")
and added language indicating that the class should be defined
"according to the laws of descent and distribution then in force"
(namely, at the time of any distribution), then they could have
anticipated and accommodated social and legal change expressly. But
even the very standard term "my descendants," or some variant of that
construction, unadorned, would prove sufficient to accommodate
social and legal evolution with the assistance of just the merest legal
presumption: that unless transferors expressly indicate otherwise,
conditional gifts to classes such as "my descendants," "my heirs," and
the like will be interpreted using the legal definitions in force at the
time of distribution, rather than at the time of the creation of the
trust.'92 Adoption of such a presumption, recommended below as part
of the package of minor reforms necessary to deal effectively with the
modern dead-hand problem, ' would eliminate entirely the ALI
authors' concerns about increasingly stale class definitions in longterm trusts, as long as the settlor did not include language requiring the
employment of the laws and definitions in place at the time of
settlement.
Of course, the obvious problem remains. While the laws of
descent of 1650 were supple enough to accommodate some of the
innovations that subsequent centuries have witnessed, they cannot
make room for them all. There are still wide categories of what we
today consider descendants who would be excluded as descendants
from the hypothetical 1650 transfer made to "my descendants, as that
term is defined by the laws now in force."'94 Because legitimacy so
thoroughly defined descendant status in that age, children born of
unwed mothers who remained unwed, under whatever conditions,
could never be considered descendants.' Rather startlingly for our
age, children of a divorced couple became illegitimate thereby.' And
while the law of 1650 legitimated children born after the death of a
parent, this exception applied only to children conceived within the
lifetime of the parent" and so expressly would not stretch to cover the
192. The current presumption, as the ALI authors note, is the reverse. See Tentative
Draft,supra note 19, at 136.
193. See infra Part VI.B.
194. See, e.g., Waggoner, supra note 43, at 11 (raising this concern).
195. See 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supm note 10, at 397.
196. See 1 BACON, supranote 182, at 752; 4 VINER, supranote 182, at 219.
197. An ancient principle permitted children born within the gestational period after
the father's death to be treated as legitimate but posthumous children of the decedent father, if

HeinOnline -- 86 Tul. L. Rev. 601 2011-2012

TULANELA WREVIEW

602

[Vol. 86:559

category of children, permitted by the modem lights of a beneficent
science, whose conception can occur long after the death of a parent.
Modem and future law can be expected to prove similarly capacious,
but also not infinitely elastic. This creates hazard, for as soon as a
jurisdiction were to adopt the presumption just proposed-that
transfers that do not explicitly require interpretation "by the laws in
place at the time of settlement" be interpreted using the laws in place
at the time of each distribution-trust drafters in that jurisdiction
would begin to include just that requirement as boilerplate. A second,
stronger presumption may be employed greatly to reduce this problem
as well, however. States could add a short section to the relevant
probate and trust codes to the effect that beneficiary-class definitions
in place at the time of each distribution will apply to transfers, despite
boilerplate to the contrary in settlement documents, unless the
application of a redefinition would directly violate a specific, explicit
restriction established by the transferor.
This stronger presumption would effectively eliminate the
problem of staleness of trust terms entirely. Settlors would simply not
be able to exclude descendants on the basis of categories or
distinctions that they had not thought of-much less of those which
did not yet exist. It is difficult to imagine how a transferor in 1650
could have articulated trust terms to head off unforeseen developments
such as technology-assisted reproduction or same-sex parentage. It
would be passing strange to discover, in any transfer from 1650, a term
by which "Iexclude from my grant any descendants, bom by means of
any black magic that allows them to spring forth from the womb of
another, though it be the true-blood descendant of my lineage."
Similarly, a 1650 settlor might well have been a bit baffled by the
notion of officially sanctioned same-sex marriages, though he was
surely aware of same-sex relationships.' Conceivably, 1650 settlors
might have inscribed the restriction: "Nor shall any descendant take
should that descendant be a descendant of an ancestor who has
engaged in a sodomitical relationship," or however they might have
phrased it. But the settlors did not pen such restrictions-or, at least, it
is difficult to imagine them doing so. They certainly did not exclude,
in terms, progeny from same-sex marriages that they cannot be
expected even to have imagined.
such treatment would prove beneficial to the child.
COMMENTARIES * 130, *456.

198.

See, eg., 1 WnLIAM BLACKSTONE,

See, e.g., Arno Karlen, The Homosexual Heresy,6 CHAUCER REv 44, 46 (1971);

see alsoHYDE H. MONTGOMERY, THE LovE THAT DARED NoT SPEAK ITs NAME 43-44 (1970).
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On the other hand, though, even this stronger presumption would
leave space for settlors to place explicit restrictions arising from
categories that they did explicitly anticipate. As this Article has noted,
it is possible the settlor of 1650 was well aware of adoption, and could
conceivably have anticipated its eventual introduction. If that settlor
included, for instance, an explicit provision indicating that "yet no
persons, however defined at law at the time of any distribution, shall
take from the income of this trust unless such person shall be related to
me by blood," then this settlor has stated an express condition. This is
not a circumstance of accidental staleness, but of clear-and expressly
considered and asserted-intent. Such conditions should be honored
unless they have, in the subsequent centuries, grown so noxious as to
violate express public policy so gravely as to forbid their continued
enforcement."
These two innovations, taken together, address without a RAP the
ALI's concerns about gate-keeping conditions. The ALI authors
worried that gate-keeping conditions would grow stale, in part because
of social, legal, or technological innovations that transferors could not
reasonably anticipate." These reforms eliminate this problem. As has
been demonstrated, transferors by definition simply cannot build
express conditions on the basis of social, legal, or technological
changes that they cannot anticipate. Because these reforms would
cause latter-day definitions of beneficiary classes to trump boilerplate
declarations in the transfer documents, transferors would also lack the
ability to veto unwittingly, or without careful thought, developments
which they would have embraced, or at least accepted.""
Accordingly, upon the adoption of these two reforms, the only
gate-keeping conditions that would persist in the face of social, legal,
and technological change would be conditions about changes that the
testator not only explicitly contemplated, but for which he made
express, specific and unconditional provision. The transferor, for
199. See infra Part VI.C (discussing courts' ability and duty to strike down noxious
conditions, but to honor others).
200. Tentative Draft, supra note 19, at 127-29. Note that the germinal seeds for these
two antistaleness provisions have already been planted in section 412(a) of the Uniform Trust
Code. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 412(a) (2005); Newman, supra note 178, at 666-67 (noting
that "general statements of the kinds of circumstances the settlor anticipated, and with respect
to which he or she would not want the trust modified or terminated, might not be specific
enough to overcome" section 412(a)'s provision allowing reformation of trust provisions upon
unanticipated circumstances).
201. See genemlly Tentative Draft, supra note 19, at 128-29 ('[T]rust-document
definitions ... become out of date over time [thus] constrain[ing] the ability of the trust to
adjust to evolving concepts of family.").
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example, might for religious reasons exclude "all would-be
beneficiaries who are conceived by a process of artificial insemination" (though almost surely in that instance the transferor would wish
to exclude the would-be beneficiaries who undertook the artificial
insemination, not merely the product of that process). Under these
circumstances, there can be no doubt whatsoever what the will of the
testator is. No failure of anticipation, no unintended boilerplate,
obscures his purpose. Such a condition might strike some contemporaries as unnecessary or unpleasant, and it might seem increasingly
unpleasant over time. If it is noxious ab initio, however, then it should
be forbidden then on public policy grounds.202 If instead it becomes
sufficiently noxious as time passes such that a later generation finds it
insupportable, the polity then in place can then forbid its further
application on public policy grounds.203 Such a measured course could
fail on only two grounds. First, either the legislature could fail to pass,
or the public could fail to support, prescription of the condition on
public policy grounds. This, though, surely would indicate the sense of
the community that the provision had not grown insupportably
noxious. Second, the public could support the public policy
determination, only to see it struck down on constitutional grounds. It
can provide no defense of the RAP, though, that a massive check on
testamentary and donative freedom be maintained in order to provide a
surreptitious check on a few rare gate-keeping conditions that it would
be unconstitutional to check overtly.
Neither can concerns about potential beneficiaries generations
hence justify revival of the RAP, because a RAP will be of no benefit
to them. Assume that a transferor today establishes a condition that no
person cloned from a single individual's genetic material, however
accomplished, might inherit from him. Assume that such a cloned
person, who would otherwise have qualified as a transferee, is born
within the RAP period. That person will not take in a RAPmaintaining jurisdiction or in a jurisdiction adopting the reforms
suggested in this Article. Assume instead that such a cloned person is
born beyond the RAP. That person will not take in a RAP-maintaining
jurisdiction, because the RAP will have effected the distribution of the
202. See infra Part VI.C.
203. The ALI authors base much of their argument in favor of the RAP on their
concern that family arrangements change over time. The reforms endorsed above would be
responsive to changes in family or other class-beneficiary designations that occur inside of
the RAP period (in ways that the Third Restatement RAP is not), a result to be expected if the
pace of such change increases, as the vectors of history suggest they likely will.
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trust res before the would-be beneficiary became available to take. He
would also not take in a jurisdiction that has instead adopted these
reforms. It might, of course, be hoped (as the ALI authors do hope)
that upon the operation of the RAP, the parties who benefit from the
distribution will turn around and devise the same trust that existed
before, merely with updated terms.20 This, though, is the sheerest
speculation. It may equally be hoped that under the reform regime
advocated here, the nonexcluded beneficiaries of our cloned person's
generation would recognize the continuing injustice of the exclusion
and would throw their distributions into a hotchpot, to share and share
alike-and such a hope would as well be nothing more than
speculation. The RAP simply does not help individuals who would be
part of a beneficiary class but for some specific exclusion.
In short, then, these two reforms answer all of the ALI authors'
concerns about gate-keeping conditions, without employing the vastly
overinclusive and unsupple formalism of a RAP.05
4.

The Quadruple Chimera of the Family-Dynasty Trust Problem

The ALI authors focus their arguments in favor of reviving the
RAP almost entirely on family-dynasty trusts.206 The concerns raised
by the authors, though, prove misplaced or chimerical in four separate
ways.
First, as has elsewhere been addressed, 207 the real, central
objection to family-dynasty trusts is not the trust bit, but the familydynasty part.20 8 But, as discussed, the appropriate response to such
concerns is attempted modification of tax policy, not maintenance of

the RAP.209
Second, while many, and perhaps most, potentially perpetual
trusts benefit only descendants and all descendants, not all such trusts
do. The narrow focus on family-dynasty trusts obscures the fact that
many objections to such trusts, whatever their validity, have no
204. Tentative Draft, supanote 19, at 127-29.
205. The ALI authors leveled a similar charge against the traditional rule, arguing that
it was inferior "because it defeats dispositions that do not violate" the limited-dead-handcontrol policy that the ALI claims to be the sole justification for the rule. Id.at 116. As the
discussion above illustrates, however, the Third Restatement RAP or any recognizable RAP
will defeat innumerable conditions that, upon the minor innovations outlined above, would
present no dead-hand control problems whatever.
206. Id ch. 27.
207. SeehiafaPartVI.
208. Tentative Draft, supanote 19, at 123-24.
209. Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 4, at 1327 ("If family dynasties are to be
prevented, only the federal government, through income and death taxes, can do it.").
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purchase when applied to conditional gifts designed either to benefit
nonfamily members or to benefit only certain members of the family.
No concerns about creating a permanent national leisure class based
on inherited wealth can arise from conditional gifts that make
beneficiaries of, say, the students in transferor's autumn 2010 property
class or "those of my descendants who graduate from law school."
Third, and somewhat relatedly, the ALI authors worry that
eventually descendants will bear only the smallest blood relationship
with the transferor.2 10 This, though, by the ALI's own lights, presents
not a problem to be solved, but a benefit to be applauded. The Third
Restatement RAP would continue to exempt charitable trusts.211 To the
extent that families become mammoth pyramids of slight actual
relationship over time, gifts to descendants of those families become
functionally indistinguishable from charitable gifts. A gift for
"educating the deserving aspiring law students of the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania"-or even of a much smaller geographical area-is a
charitable gift exempted from this new RAP (and from previous
iterations).212 A grantor might make that gift because of the grantor's
sentimental ties to his geographical homeland and his profession. The
law permits such a gift to run in perpetuity and rewards its nobility
with tax concessions. Given the speed with which genuine blood
association dilutes over generations, a grant "educating the deserving
aspiring law students who are descendants of my line" is based in the
same generalized sentimentality and will serve the same functional
purpose. The analogy extends: to the extent that a principalconserving trust established with the income to be sprayed equally "to
the members of the graduating class of my high school, so that they
may have resources with which to begin adulthood" represents a
charitable trust,"' so, too, does a fixed-sum distribution to family
beneficiaries, effectively, after a few generations begin to resemble a
charitable trust.
In other words, because of the very dilution in blood relationship
that the ALI recognizes, private trusts eventually become functionally
indistinguishable from charitable trusts. Yet, for no very coherent
reason, not only does such a gift receive, after that "dilution point" is
reached, no charitable tax exemption, but instead the gift is curtailed
entirely-in favor of an unconditional disbursement of wealth to lineal
210. Tentative Draft, supra note 19, at 118-19.
211. Seeid§27.3,atl58-63.
212.
213.

Id.; RESTATEMENT (THRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 (2003).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28(b), (f) & cmts.
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descendants-by the RAP where the Rule still exists. According to
the ALI's own logic, neither this distinction nor this result make sense.
As noted elsewhere, it seems that the RAP's application has primarily
the deleterious effect of promoting the growth of an easy-living,
unproductive overclass by eliminating valuable conditional
enticements to industry and thrift, and instead bestowing an
unconditioned windfall on certain arbitrarily favored descendants of
highly successful wealth generators.214 The point here is not that
family-directed trusts should eventually be afforded charitable trust
status, necessarily. Rather, it is that the ALI authors' putative concerns
about the dilution of relationship between transferor and transferees
are chimerical, and a RAP would provide no benefits as applied to the
issue of dilution even if dilution were a genuine problem.215
Fourth, the ALI authors worry that trusts unbounded by a RAP
will result in thousands of trustees facing the impossible task of
keeping up with tens of thousands or even millions of beneficiaries,
threatened always by the specter of personal liability if they were to
make a mistaken distribution or an unintentionally partial investment
decision."' Even the ALI authors themselves, though, recognize that
this argument is a red herring, admitting:
Indeed, in a worst case scenario, the costs of administering a perpetual
trust could become so large that they would consume the trust, leaving
nothing for the settlor's descendants, the supposed beneficiaries. But
such an outcome would render the trust capricious, in violation of the
rule of mandatory law that "a private trust, its terms and its
administration must be for the benefit of its beneficiaries . . . ." Long
before reaching that point, the trustee of such a trust would be under a
fiduciary obligation to petition the court to terminate the trust to prevent
such an outcome. In this sense, the perpetual trust is structurally
illusory-it would self-destruct in the course of administration.

214. SeesupmPartlV
215. The Reporter for the Third Restatement RAP, Lawrence Waggoner, elsewhere
suggested, in introducing the matter of steadily decreasing blood connection, that
"[t]ransferors by nature prefer to benefit known descendants, not remote unknown
descendants." Waggoner, supranote 43, at 4. The problem is that this statement about human
nature is refuted exactly to the extent that transferors are taking advantage of long-term or
perpetual trusts. If Waggoner were right about what transferors "naturally" prefer, then
perpetuities rules would never do any work. The fact that Waggoner feels obliged so
forcefully to favor revival of the RAP demonstrates the flaw in his analysis.
216. Tentative Draft, supra note 19, at 119-22, 126-27; see also Waggoner, supm note
43, at 5-9.
217. Tentative Draft, supra note 19, at 122 n.36 (citation omitted); see also UNIF.
TRUST CODE §§ 105(b)(4) (2005) (noting that a settlor cannot vary the rules of trust
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In fact, then, there is no fear that trusts will become mere engines of
administrative costs; the mechanism is already in place to avoid that
result.218 Moreover, the already extant mechanism (sometimes called
or analogized to equitable deviation and the cy pres doctrine 2 9 )
available for avoiding such a fate provides a firm basis upon which to
enact another minor reform to achieve the purposes of the RAP
without its liabilities. This reform could be called a "rule of
administrative efficiency."
Building on the foundations just
considered, it would direct a trustee to petition the court for
modification of the terms of a trust any time more than some fixed
percentage of the currently distributable portion of the trust (say
twenty percent) were being lost to overhead. Modification should be
made with an eye toward doing as much of the transferor's intent as is
possible, consistent with a total administrative cost projected to remain
below the relevant ceiling. (Alternatively, the rule could allow trustees
to make this determination and these modifications themselves,
consistent with and bounded by their fiduciary duty.)
It is possible, as the ALI authors seem to imply, quite
contradictorily, that a rule of administrative efficiency would
effectively extinguish family-dynasty trusts before too many
generations pass.220 If that is true, then such a rule neatly accomplishes
the family-dynasty-related purposes used as justification for retaining
the RAP If it is not true, then the authors' concerns about massively
multiplying beneficiary pools have no applicability, even to familydynasty trusts.
Additionally, to the extent that this concern about vast pools of
beneficiaries is valid, it obviates the ALI authors' professed concern
that perpetual family-dynasty trusts will actually lead to massively
wealthy and influential family dynasties. As logic and the rules of
division dictate, and as history shows, no wealth, however great and
modification and termination), 412(b) (noting that a court may modify an administrative term
if following the term would prove "wasteful").
218. Nor are trustees hopeless drudges cowering under the unrelenting fear that they
might at any time be sued for the malperformance of an impossible task; trustees can resign
their positions at any time. See, e.g., Daniel M. Schuyler, The FiduciaryMust Know the
Law, 56 Nw.U. L.REv. 177, 189 (1961).
219. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THRD) OF TRUSTS § 66 (2003); UNiF. TRUST CODE
§ 412(a) (equitable deviation), (b) (cypes for private trusts).
220. Tentative Draft, supra note 19, at 122 n.36. Because trustees need not administer
trusts into capriciousness, "the perpetual trust is structurally illusory-it would self-destruct
in the course of administration." Id. Of course, the authors fail to recognize that only the
family-dynasty variety of perpetual trust would face such extinction, or bear any danger of
creating the problems that they consider.
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however productive, can be subdivided generationally for long and still
provide much of a living for the later-coming beneficiaries, who at
each generation find their slice of the wealth increasingly
inconsequential.221
The ALI authors paint with a broad brush, failing to recognize
that many of the purposes for which the RAP once existed have
functionally disappeared, thus fatally weakening the case for reviving
the RAP. The various minor reforms proposed throughout this Part,
and summarized in Part VI below, 22 2 provide protection against all of
the still-extant concerns that might justify reviving the RAP, all
without curtailing the vast plethora of potentially nonproblematic longterm conditional gifts by operation of the massive mechanical
overbreadth of the RAP. In this sense, the proposed reforms achieve
what Professor Simpson identified as the primal purpose of the RAP
before it became formalized-'"to favour prudent 22and sensible
dispositions, and, as a corollary, invalidate foolish ones."' 3
B.

The PardcularDrawbacksof the ThirdRestatementProposal

The last Part demonstrated that the RAP, in fundamental purpose
and design, is the product of a far different legal, political, and social
era and is, in whatever specific form, a blunt and poor instrument for
addressing the concerns that obtain to contemporary conditions. This
Part demonstrates that the specific RAP proposed in the Third
Restatement-like any specific version of a now-obsolete
instrument-carries with it specific flaws that add to its general
unattractiveness to state legislatures. A discussion of why the states are
unlikely, in any case, to adopt the Third Restatement proposal appears
at Subpart 1 below. Subpart 2 addresses problems unique to the Third
Restatement RAP that will likely render adoption of this RAP even
more unattractive to the states.
1.

States Unlikely To Adopt Third Restatement RAP in Any Event

The ALI will face an uphill struggle in convincing states to adopt
the Third Restatement RAP Trust-settling constituents clearly favor
RAP abolition, partly for reasons of tax benefit, but also because
221. See, eg., Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 706-10 (1987) (demonstrating how
rapidly worthless becomes a patrimony divided equally between all new descendants at each
generation).
222. See inf Part VI.
223.

Tentative Draft, supra note 19, at 115 (quoting StIPsoN, LEADING CASES, Supra

note 3, at 78).
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constituents appear independently to like the opportunity to create
perpetual conditional gifts.224 Trust-cmhng constituents-such as
attorneys and trust companies-clearly favor RAP abolition because it
eliminates the concern of malpractice lawsuits if they misconstrue or
misapply the Rule.225 States legislators will thus have virtually no
incentive to revive the RAP as long as preferential tax treatment
accrues to those who settle trusts in their states, and they will have
strong reason to maintain RAP abolition thereafter.226
History, meanwhile, suggests that the Third Restatement RAP
will not fare well. In the Second Restatement, issued in 1979, the ALI
proposed a wait-and-see RAP that nevertheless continued to use the
traditional life-in-being-plus-twenty-one-years formula. Despite the
fact that the wait-and-see revolution had already begun and was by
then the modern trend,22 7 only Iowa adopted the Second Restatement
RAP.228 Not until the USRAP, which offered states the innovation of a
clear, simple ninety-year wait-and-see period, did additional states
begin to jump on board.229
The Third Restatement RAP mounts the stage under even less
propitious circumstances. First, while it is marginally less complicated
than the traditionalRAP, it is arguably a good deal less user-friendly
than a ninety-year wait-and-see period and vastly more complicated
and restrictive than having no RAP at all. Thus, because other versions
of the rule have superseded the traditional RAP everywhere,230 the
Third Restatement RAP will represent not a simplification but a
significant complication in virtually every state that might consider
adopting it.
Additionally, momentum does not favor the Third Restatement
RAP. As noted, by the time the USRAP's innovations were introduced,
wait and see had already become the modern trend. The case is the
reverse for the Third Restatement RAP. For more than twenty years,
all of the momentum in state legislatures has been toward simplifying,
weakening, and abolishing the RAP, not strengthening and

224. See, e g., Tate, supra note 24, at 611-20.
225. See Sterk, supanote 78, at 2100-01.
226. See id. at 2117-18 (cataloguing other reasons why legislatures are unlikely to act
to revive the Rule).
227. See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 4, at 1305-06 (adopting wait and see in
Pennsylvania in 1947, with five other states following by 1979).
228. Id. at 1307.
229. Id.at 1307-08 & n.20.
230. See Tentative Draft, supra note 19, at 118-19.

HeinOnline -- 86 Tul. L. Rev. 610 2011-2012

20 121]

D YING PERPETUITIESR ULES

61 1

complicating it. Moreover, no state has ever adopted a RAP that looks
anything like the Third Restatement's proposal.
In short, the auguries bode ill for the Third Restatement RAP
even without a deep examination of its content.
2.

Specific Characteristics of the Third Restatement RAP Likely To
Inhibit Adoption Further

The ALI is, then, as it were, starting in a hole: the states,
especially those that have effectively or entirely abolished the RAP
already, have significant interests in maintaining or continuing the
abolition position.
As this Article develops below, specific
characteristics of the Third Restatement RAP seem destined to
reinforce those interests and further inhibit the likelihood of adoption.
Perhaps the single specific characteristic of the Third
Restatement RAP most likely to promote this reluctance is this: not
only does the Third Restatement Rule broaden the application of the
RAP--extending it to what has traditionally been considered vested
interests unhampered by the Rule (such as reversions)"2 -but it also,
despite the authors' protestations to the contrary, effectively reduces
the perpetuities period as well.232 Thus, not only does the ALI have to
convince states that have abolished the RAP to revive it, but to revive a
specific version of the RAP radically more restrictive than those that
they have discarded.
The perpetuities-period shortening effect of the Third
Restatement RAP is demonstrated most clearly in the context of
conditional gifts to nonfamily transferees, but the effect applies to all
relevant gifts. Under the USRAP, conditional gifts to all parties are
valid if they actually vest or terminate within ninety years after their
creation.233 Under the Third Restatement Rule, however, conditional
gifts to nonfamily transferees are valid if they terminate at the end of a
measuring life "no more than the equivalent of two generations
younger than the transferor." 234 For equivalencies, the Third
Restatement Rule posits twenty-five-year-long generations, and it
places the transferor at the middle of her generation as the baseline for
establishing future generations. Thus, nonfamily transferees are
231. Seid.§ 27.1 cmt. a, at 136.
232. Seeid. at 130.
233. UNIF. STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 1(b) (1990). The interests are
also valid under the RAP if they would have been valid under the traditional common law
RAP. Seeid. § 1(a).
234. Tentative Draft, supra note 19, § 27.1(a)-(b)(i), at 135-36.
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considered to be members of the same generation if they are within
twelve and a half years of the age of the transferor, the next generation
if they are within twelve and a half and thirty-seven and a half years,
and two generations if they are within thirty-seven and a half and
sixty-two and a half years younger.
This creates a perpetuities period that is demonstrably and
significantly shorter than the one created by the USRAP, as an
example will demonstrate. Transferor T establishes a testamentary
trust, leaving the interest generated by the trust, but not the principal,
to A and A's lineal descendants for as long as the relevant perpetuities
rules will permit, and then making a gift of the principal to a local
university. Under the USRAP, all of A's descendants born (or
adopted) for ninety years after his death will be qualified transferees,
and the grants to each of them will immediately vest. As a result, I's
wishes will be honored for ninety years and potentially far longer,
unless all beneficiaries agree to terminate or modify the trust.23'
However, the Third Restatement's Rule honors Ts conditional gift
only for the life span of some party born within, at most, sixty-two and
a half years of T's birth. This means that if we assume that both T
and T's last qualified beneficiary live lives of the same length,236 then
T's gift will be honored for only at most sixty-two and a half years,
and on average fifty years,237 after T's death, and then will terminate
entirely. This includes living parties who had already begun to share in
the gift (unless those already-taking beneficiaries are under thirty, in
which case the conditions may continue until, at most, those takers
turn thirty). Compared to the ninety-year vesting period of the
USRAP, followed by years of continuing execution, the Third
Restatement Rule manifestly and significantly shortens the
perpetuities period: in fact, it cuts it roughly in half.
The example above deals with grants to nonfamily members.
The effect of the Third Restatement Rule on actual families will
depend on the vagaries of birth patterns within those families. Given
that the ALI explicitly designed the twenty-five-year generation
designations to establish a perpetuity-limiting measuring life that is
235. See, eg., RESTATEMENT (THiRD) OF TRUSTS § 65 cmt. a (2003).
236. This effect is mitigated somewhat, but not much, if we assume, as I have
elsewhere, that longevity will continue to increase, so that Ts last qualified beneficiary in
fact lives perhaps as much as ten years longer than T
237. The two-generation rule will allow conditional gifts to continue only as long as
the conditions terminate within the life of a transferee born, on aveage,fifty years later than
the transferor.
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"the equivalent of two generations younger than the transferor,"238
though, it seems appropriate on the ALI's own terms to expect that the
perpetuity-period shortening effect will prove the same for intrafanily
grants as for nonfamily grants. Rerunning the same hypothetical as
appeared above, substituting Ts own lineal descendants for A's, and
positing descendants of the same longevity in each instance, will
demonstrate this result.
This conclusion gains further strength from a careful reading of
the ALI's own consideration of the question of perpetuity-period
lengths. It claims that its new Rule will not, on average, change the
length of the perpetuities period."' It supports this claim by suggesting
that "[tihe generations-based perpetuity period will potentially be
shorter than one based on lives in being," though not, significantly, one
based on a ninety-year wait-and-see period "if the transferor dies after
the birth or conception of all of the beneficiaries of the transferor's
trust who are members of the second generation below the transferor's
generation."240 On the other hand, "The generations-based perpetuity
period will potentially be longer than one based on lives in being if the
transferor dies before the birth or conception of all of the beneficiaries
of the transferor's trust who are members of the second generation
below the transferor's generation."24' The authors fail to recognize,
however, that in an era of increasing longevity,242 the odds that a
transferor will die before the birth of all of her grandchildren grows
ever slimmer, while the possibility of living to see a complete set of
great- and even great-great-grandchildren born grows ever more likely.
Moreover, the authors fail to recognize that the shift from requiring
interests to vest within a certain period after a transferor's death to
requiring conditions to terminate within, in effect, a certain (much
smaller) number of years after the transferor was born must have the
effect, on average, of radically reducing the perpetuities period.
238. Tentative Draft, supra note 19, § 27.1(b)(1), at 136.
239. Id. at 130 ("Although the length of the two periods will be different in individual
cases, the average length will probably work out to be about the same.").
240. Id
241. Id.at 131.
242. It is generally accepted that lifespans are headed upward in coming years, as they
have been for more than a century. See, e.g., LAURA B. SHRESTHA, CRS REPORT FOR
CONGRESS: LIFE EXPECTANCY INTHE UNITED STATES (2006). There are, however, doubters.

S. Jay Olshansky et al., A PotentialDecline in Life Expectancy in the United States in the
21st Century, 352 N. ENG. J. MED. 1138, 1138-45 (2005); Amanda Sonnega, The Future of
Human Life Expectancy Have We Reached the Ceiling or Is the Sky the Linit., RES.
HIGHLIGHTs DEMOGRAPHY & EcoN. AGING, Mar. 2006, at 1, 1-4 (noting the increase may
continue if behaviors change).
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Meanwhile, increasing longevity will render the two-generation
Rule increasingly restrictive in future years, and increasingly
inconsistent with a fundamental purpose of the ALI in proposing
revival of the RAP-ensuring that the construction of conditional gifts,
and the law that applies to such gifts, remain supple to changing social
and technological developments.243 If grandma lives to be 120 and to
watch her great-grandchildren grow into adulthood and reproduce,
then her functional perpetuities period is reduced to only one
generation-and, even then, only to those members of that generation
who happen to be alive when she dies.2" And the rule would not even
permit her to establish a single trust for the benefit of all those living
great-grandchildren; she would have to establish separate trusts for
each one.245 If, meanwhile, by an unlucky accident, her greatgrandchildren have reached adulthood, but have not yet reached the
stage of reproduction, then her perpetuities period will not reach to any
generation. Taken as a whole, this result effectively reduces the
perpetuities period to nothing beyond the lives of those who happen to
be in being upon the transferor's death.
A final practical problem arises from the inability of the Third
Restatement Rule to effect transferor intent in the manner that it
purports. Courts following the Third Restatement Rule would
ostensibly face the obligation to do the transferor's intent when the
perpetuity period ends and the res must be distributed.24 6 Obviously,
though, if a court finds itself having to make such a judicial
modification, it will be because the transferor both did not intend for
the res to be distributed, and made no express provisions for such a
contingency. In such circumstances, the best that a court is likely to
have is this negative inference: that whatever the transferor may have
wanted, she did not want the conditional beneficiaries to take the res
absent those conditions. And yet it will often be the case that the only
plausible option available to the judge is to do that very single thing
that was obviously not the intention of the transferor-namely, to give
243. Tentative Draft, supra note 19, at 128-29.
244. Id § 27.1 (b)(2), at 136.
245. See id. § 27.1 cmt. h, at 144. This rule creates obvious administrative and
allocative inefficiency by requiring multiple instruments where one could suffice. Allocative
inefficiency-and, ironically enough, an artificial strengthening of dead-hand control-is
heightened even further when trusts must be created, and corpuses allocated, at an initial
position for the benefit of one individual only, rather than allowing (though not of course
requiring) a single trust to be created with a corpus that can be allocated as between some
class of transferees at the discretion of a trustee capable of taking changing circumstances
fully into account.
246. Seeid § 27.2, at 153.
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the res unconditionally to those very transferees-because no other
single option out of the infinite combination of potential options
presents itself as likely to have anything to do with the testator's wishes
at all.247 Section 27.2 of the Tentative Draft is thus something of a
sham: the courts will often find the most (or only) plausible
"modification" available to be the very thing that the transferor
explicitly did not intend.24 8
The temper of the times, the incentives facing legislators, and the
specific characteristics of the Third Restatement RAP, then, all suggest
that it will-as it should-face a difficult path to adoption in the states.
VI. THE COUNTERPROPOSAL SUMMARIZED
The true extent-and limits-of genuine modem dead-hand
control problems were addressed in Part IVA, along with detailed
explanations of the potential non-RAP solutions to those problems that
this Article proposes as a replacement for the RAP. The proposed
reforms are summarized as a package below.
A.

The Rule ofAdmbnistrativeEfficiency

First, states should, either by judicial innovation or by legislation,
expand the equitable doctrine that permits trustees to seek
modification of a trust when further trust administration would be
futile or impracticable into a clear and reliable "rule of administrative
efficiency."24 This rule would allow-or perhaps in fact requiremodification of trust terms when the cost of administering the trust
reached some fixed percentage of either the income or the res of the
trust. (The relevant threshold would of course be larger if measured
against trust income, smaller if measured against the res.) The states
should establish this rule as a default, to apply unless the transferor has
explicitly considered the issue of efficient trust administration, and has
either set a different threshold for modification than the default, or has
barred its application altogether. Were a transferor to take the latter
247. In fact, this very exercise of judicial modification was the only express example
the authors provided of "doing the transferor's intent." See id. § 27.2 cmt. c, illus. at 154; see
also Waggoner, supm note 44, at 5 ("In most cases, the form of modification will accelerate
the right to possession of the beneficiaries of the trust or other disposition.").
248. The rule of administrative efficiency would still require modification of trust
conditions in some instances, and would therefore be liable to such problems as well-but,
because of the flexibility inherent in the rule of administrative efficiency and lacking in the
RAP, the problem would arise far less often. See infia Part VI.A.
249. See supra notes 216-219 and accompanying text (discussing doctrine).
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course, the trustee would continue to administer the trust until the
trustee exhausted the principal.250 While it is theoretically possible that
a transferor might explicitly elect such an obviously counterproductive
course, effective in the end to benefit only the trustee, practically, it is
extremely unlikely.
States could determine by their own lights whether they prefer the
modifications arising under the rule to proceed under court direction
after petition by the trustee, or upon the independent judgment of the
trustee, constrained by fiduciary duty. States could elect to make this a
default rule as well. However the decision is made, states should
design it to do the will of the transferor as far as possible while
bringing total administrative costs under the relevant threshold, and
putting administration on a footing designed to allow it to remain
under that floor for the foreseeable future, or, alternatively, to wind up
the trust (if such would do the preferred intent of the transferor, or if no
way existed to continue administering the trust at an appropriate level
of expense). While there is some small danger that achieving the
transferor's intent in this process will prove as difficult as upon
dissolution of the trust at the end of the RAP period,"' the added
flexibility provided by the abolition of the RAP's dissolution
imperative will render that result far less likely. Returning to our
regular example, assume that a transferor has established a trust, with
the income from the trust to pay the educational expenses of "those of
my descendants who attend law school." The settlor's intent here is not
perfectly plain, but the things he obviously did not intend are quite
clear: he did not intend that any descendants who did not attend law
school should be beneficiaries; he did not intend that law-schoolattendee descendants should receive benefits for purposes other than
paying for law school; he did not intend that some but not all of his
descendants who attended law school should benefit; and he did not
intend that the principal of the trust be invaded to achieve his purposes.
Modifying this trust-either because so many descendants take
advantage of it that administrative costs grow prohibitive, or because
law school tuition continues to rise at so much faster a rate than market
returns that the trust's income proves insufficient to satisfy all
demands-will of course require deviation from some of the
transferor's wishes. Specifically, either this modification will exclude
250. But see UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 105(b)(4), 412(b) (2005) (providing, where
adopted, that the settlor cannot vary by instrument the power of the court to modify an
administration term that is "wasteful").
251. See supm notes 246-248 and accompanying text.
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some would-be beneficiaries, or the modifications will invade the
principal. Because the option of maintaining the trust remains,
however, some solution could be crafted that fulfills most of the
intentions of the transferor for as long as possible-a genuine secondbest result.
Compare this result to the result upon the forced distribution of
the trust at the end of the RAP period. The transfer, and the
transferor's demonstrable intent, is the same. The court's (or the
trustee's) ability to establish and do the testator's second-best intent,
however, is profoundly diminished. While the transferor explicitly did
not intend unconditional distributions to any beneficiaries, dissolution
of the trust requires it. But to whom should the distributions occur,
and for what purposes? To non-law school attendees? To law school
To some third party not
attendees for nontuition purposes?
contemplated by the transferor at all for noncontemplated but
conceivably relevant purposes-say, to a local law school to establish a
scholarship fund? All of these are equally bad, and equally intentdefeating options. All are unnecessarily forced by the RAP.
While the rule of administrative efficiency is presented in the
preceding paragraphs as a rule of trust administration, states could
extend it to apply to legal future interests as well as equitable onesassuming that states do not elect to abolish legal future interests
entirely.252 The rule would allow owners of conditional or fractional
legal interests to petition for modification of the conditional gifts when
the costs of administering the relevant interests reach a certain
threshold, or when, by contrast, the income or value of the property
subject to the relevant interests is sufficiently reduced as a result of the
conditional or fractional interests involved.'
B.

Two AntistalenessPresumptions

Second, in response to the concern that conditions established by
nonprescient transferors will potentially continue to guide distributions
long into the future, states should adopt one of a pair of presumptions
to protect against inartful or incomplete drafting that could render the
conditions unintentionally stale in the face of changes in the law of
families and descent and/or social or technological developments. The
first of these presumptions would, in the absence of express language
252. SeenfraPartVI.D.
253. This rule is discussed in additional detail supm notes 216-221 and accompanying
text.

HeinOnline -- 86 Tul. L. Rev. 617 2011-2012

618

TULANE LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 86:559

to the contrary, interpret class gifts so that the class of beneficiaries
(for example, descendants, heirs) is determined using the definitions of
those terms in place at the time each individual distribution is made,
not the definitions in place when the transferor established the
conditions. This will ensure that unless the transferor had expressed a
contrary intent, the conditions established by the transfer will evolve
along with changing legal, social, and technological conditions. A
second, stronger measure (which would, unlike the first presumption,
likely require legislative action) would deem changes in relevant
beneficiary-class definitions to apply to transfers established before
the change was made, despite any general language such as "as
presently defined at law," unless the application of a redefinition would
directly violate a specific, explicit restriction established by the
transferor. This stronger provision would, as considered above,254 make
it virtually impossible for a transferor to guard against changed
circumstances that the transferor could not foresee, and avoid any
possibility that the transferor would accidentally fix her conditions to a
single, time-fixed set of legal and social precepts as a result of
language that could be characterized as boilerplate. Only classes that
the transferor had defined specifically to include or exclude certain
explicit characteristics would remain immutable-and only with
regard to those explicit characteristics-in the face of change. Which
of these options each state selects would be determined by how it
balances the competing interests of donative freedom and social
evolution, and whether it considers phrases like "as presently defined
at law" to be boilerplate.
C. PublicPolicyRejection ofNoxious Condions When They
Become Noxious
Next, to avoid conditional gifts that create incentives or affect
third parties in ways that the public determines to be insupportable,
courts and legislatures must act at the time the conditions become
noxious to forbid or texture their further application. Such conditions
can potentially be seen, for example, in transferor efforts to influence
would-be beneficiaries to make certain faith-based or life style
decisions255 or to protect assets from a beneficiary's creditors.256 If
these conditions really are insupportable, then they should not be
254. See supm notes 179-201 and accompanying text.
255. See supranotes 175-178 and accompanying text (marry-in-faith discussion).
256. See supranotes 175-178 and accompanying text (discussion of spendthrift trusts).
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supported-from the moment they grow insupportable, not from a
couple of generations hence. Conditions that do not meet the
threshold of noxiousness, though-and particularly conditions against
which no reasonable objection can be raised-ought not to be
mechanically struck down by a RAP. Determinations of nonenforcement should be made only warily and hesitantly, remembering always
that the transferor had no obligation to make any transfer at all. Judges
should also remember that the would-be beneficiary who is excluded
from taking by a condition therefore has no cognizable claim to take,
and is free always to live as she would have had no conditional transfer
ever been made; and that but for the inclusion of the contested
condition, the transferor might well have made a different transfer
altogether. Hence, judges should almost always defer to the
transferor's express intent and permit the condition, unless the
legislature has expressed the public policy of the state by forbidding
such conditions, or unless the condition would violate a constitutional
imperative.
D

Abolish the RuleAgainstPerpetuities,Whle GuardingAgainst
InalienableLong-Term Gills

Finally, of course, those states that have not yet wholly abolished
their RAPs should do so.
Of course, the argument mounted in this Article in favor of
abolishing the RAP is premised on the notion that the conditional
transfers under consideration are made free of alienation restrictions, a
safe conclusion for the vast majority of such gifts in the modem
world.257 It is always possible, though, that a transferor might attempt
to make a perpetual, inalienable gift, such as a string of perpetual life
estates in a fixed piece of family property. This hypothetical
possibility could be dealt with in a number of ways. Jurisdictions
could follow the British model and simply abolish legal life estates,
instantly transforming any attempts at establishing such life estates into
equitable interests as a matter of law.258 Alternatively, states could
follow Professor Gallanis's suggestion of imposing a fixed-term

257. SeesupmPartVA.2.
258. See, e.g., A.J. McClean, The Common Law Life Estate and the Civi Law
Usufruct: A ComparativeStudy, 12 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 649, 653, 657 (1963). Pennsylvania
has started down that path, having abolished life estates in personalty. See20 PA. CONs. STAT.
ANN. § 6113 (2005).
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limit 259 --but only on attempts to establish perpetual, hialienable,
conditional transfers. Thus, states could allow such transfers to remain
inalienable for a certain number of years (Gallanis proposed ninety),
and convert them automatically into fully alienable trusts after the end
of the fixed period. The latter seems preferable because it makes some
attempt to respect the owner and transferor's wishes that certain
specified property remain in the family for as long as the state deems
reasonable, given the testator's inability to foresee potential future
consequences of inalienability. It is with regard to inalienability
specifically, not broader general questions about "dead-hand control'"
that issues of 'strik[ing] a fair balance between the desires of
members of the present generation, and similar desires of succeeding
generations,"' in consideration of "'those persons and events which the
Transferor knows and sees, and those which he cannot know or see,'
become coherently operative.260 On the other hand, a state might
reasonably conclude, as some have done,"2 ' that a good swap can be
made by eliminating the RAP but also eliminating alienability
restrictions entirely. Either of these options deals effectively with the
remnant possibility of perpetual inalienability conditions, without any
need to revive the RAP.
A less-favored hedge against full abolition would be to save a last
vestige of the Rule to apply where parties who are descendants of the
transferor and who would be the final beneficiaries in the event of a
dissolution can show that the property (or an amount of property equal
to it) subject to the transferor's conditions was not earned by the
testator, but was instead passed unencumbered from some familial
ancestor. For all the reasons discussed above, however, and because
this issue is not important enough in any case to justify maintaining the
rickety, otherwise wholly unnecessary RAP, the Rule should be
entirely abolished.
VII. CONCLUSION
While some of the concerns that animated the rise of the RAP
remain, changing social, technological, and legal realities have
significantly reduced or wholly eliminated most of these concerns.
259. See supm note 102 and accompanying text. Gallanis, of course, proposed a
ninety-year limit on allattempted perpetuities.
260. Tentative Draft, supra note 19, at 114 (quoting HOBHOUSE, supra note 88, at 188;
Simes, supm note 87, at 723).
261. See, eg., Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 4, at 1313 (citing IDAHO CODE § 55111 (2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-5-1, -8 (1997); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 700.16 (West 2001)).
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The concern that long-term or perpetual conditional gifts would lock
up property in inalienable suspension has largely evaporated. Of the
types of conditions that transferors can place on gifts, one typeprincipal-preserving conditions--cannot, a pnion, harm either general
social welfare or the welfare of potential but as-yet unidentified
beneficiaries, while the settlor can be expected fully to have accounted
for the effects of the conditions on already extant beneficiaries. The
other type-gate-keeping conditions-prove largely beneficial or
States can deal with those conditions that grow
innocuous.
cumbersome or noxious with simple rules that will apply when those
eventualities occur. Concerns that these gate-keeping rules will grow
inconsonant with changing social or technological realities are
overblown, but states can deal with them by small changes to
interpretive presumptions.
The ALI authors have argued that states must revive the RAP to
thwart perpetual, conditional gifts, in part because the conditions that
inform those gifts might grow unfit for future purpose. In the end,
though, it is the RAP that has outlived its usefulness-its blunt,
unnuanced features designed for and fitted to an age long past. The
Rule Against Perpetuities is the dead hand that must finally be
interred.

HeinOnline -- 86 Tul. L. Rev. 621 2011-2012

&

HeinOnline -- 86 Tul. L. Rev. 622 2011-2012

